## 1NC

### Off

#### Environmental reformism is merely an exercise in blame shifting and assuaging guilt, shielding us from ever having to take responsibility for our own personal complicity in the environmental crisis

**Bobertz, 95** (Bradley, Nebraska Law, Legitimizing Pollution Through Pollution Control Laws: Reflections on Scapegoating Theory, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 711)

A routine pattern in environmental lawmaking is a tendency to blame environmental problems on easily identifiable objects or entities rather than on the social and economic practices that actually produce them. [n17](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n17) Once identified as the culprit of an environmental problem, this blame-holder comes to symbolize and embody the problem itself. Lawmaking then begins to resemble a re-enactment of a scapegoat ritual, in which the community's misfortunes are symbolically transferred to an entity that is then banished or slain in order to cleanse the community of its collective wrongdoing and remove the source of its adversity. The topic of scapegoating is commonly encountered in studies of racism, [n18](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n18) family psychology, [n19](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n19) and mass sociology, [n20](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n20) but is not often associated with law and legal scholarship. Nevertheless, parallels appear to exist between the general scapegoat phenomenon and environmental lawmaking.The term "scapegoat" derives from the guilt offerings ceremony set forth in the biblical book of Leviticus. According to the Levitical  [\*717]  scapegoat ceremony, Aaron placed both hands on the head of a live goat and confessed the sins of the people of Israel. [n21](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n21) Having thereby transferred the collective guilt of the people to the goat, he drove the goat into the desert "to carry off their iniquities to an isolated region." [n22](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n22) This ceremony was to be repeated each year on the Day of Atonement. Other sacrifice rituals, including the "sin offering for the community" [n23](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n23) and the "guilt offerings," [n24](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n24) were to be performed on a periodic basis. Essentially identical, [n25](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n25) these other ceremonies involve the slaying of a young bull as a means for forgiving inadvertent transgressions of the people. [n26](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n26)Other cultures also employ similar sacrifice rituals to expunge evils brought about by the collective misconduct of the community. Beginning with James Frazer's The Golden Bough, [n27](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n27) anthropologists have catalogued a remarkable variety of sacrifice rituals intended to expel collective sin. [n28](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n28) Despite subtle variations in form and emphasis, these ceremonies follow a remarkably similar pattern: the participants view the ritual as a necessary measure for expelling collective wrongdoing, often after some misfortune or calamity has befallen the community. [n29](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n29) Often, both the transference of the community's sins to the scapegoat object and the sacrifice of the object itself are performed by persons having special standing in the community, typically of a religious character. [n30](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n30) [\*718]  While we might view these sacrifice rituals as acts of merely symbolic import, the participants themselves clearly believe the ceremonies accomplish their desired ends. The people of Southern Africa do not place the blood of their sick people on the head of a goat (which is then banished to the veldt) to engage the curiosity of European anthropologists. They simply intend to make sick people well. [n31](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n31) Likewise, the people put to death in Salem were killed because they were thought (proven!) to be witches, not because they were personifications of some other social anxiety. [n32](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n32) To the detached observer, the bizarre and gruesome aspects of the ceremonies may stand out, but the participants do what they do because they believe it will work. [n33](http://www.lexisnexis.com.proxygsu-wgc1.galileo.usg.edu/us/lnacademic/frame.do?tokenKey=rsh-20.453078.1478331385&target=results_DocumentContent&reloadEntirePage=true&rand=1236223023921&returnToKey=20_T5953416716&parent=docview#n33)This Article is not intended to support the notion that the targets of environmental regulation, in one way or another, are "scapegoats" in the common understanding of the term -- deserving of pity and freedom from compliance with environmental laws. Instead, I intend to shed light on a simple but troubling pattern: Environmental legislation is more likely to emerge from the lawmaking process when the problem it seeks to control is readily symbolized by an identifiable object, entity, or person -- a "scapegoat" in the sense discussed above. In the absence of such a scapegoat, however, lawmakers are less likely to take action. This pattern is particularly problematic because the identified scapegoat often bears an incomplete or distorted relationship to the actual problem at hand, resulting in laws that are likewise incomplete or distorted. As discussed below in Part V, because we deal harshly with culturally accepted symbols of environmental problems, it is less likely that we will deal with the problems (and their causes) themselves. For anyone concerned about the correlation between social problems and the legal regimes we create to solve them, this phenomenon should be cause for concern.

#### Additionally, the Affirmative’s production centered focus impoverishes our understanding of the environmental crisis, diminishing our ability to understand and respond to the consumptive practices that create pollution.

Princen, 3 (Thomas, Global Environmental Politics, February)

Research within the economic strands of social science disciplines such as political science, sociology, and anthropology has been preponderantly in the "environmental improvement" category. Pollution control, environmental movements, and environmental organizations are common topics. At the same time that social science has focused on environmental improvement, those who chart biophysical trends say incremental change is not enough. Every time a "state of the environment" report comes out, authors call for a fundamental shift in how humans relate to nature. Some call for global citizenship, others for spiritual awakening. But nearly all call for a drastic overhaul of the current economic system, a system that is inherently and uncontrollably expansionist, that depends on ever-increasing throughput of material and energy, that risks life-support systems for humans and other species. They call, in short, for transformational change, what I have put in the category of sustainability. And, then, the best prescriptions these analysts, who largely are not students of human behavior, come up with are better information, greater efficiencies, more public participation and, for specific measures, new taxes and subsidies -- all classic marginal tinkering. If the social sciences are going to make a contribution that is commensurate with the severity of biophysical trends, it must do better than analyze environmental improvement measures. Social scientists must develop analytic tools for the analyst (biophysical and social alike) and an effective vocabulary for the policy maker and activist that allow, indeed encourage, an escape from well-worn prescriptions that result in marginal change at best. Among those tools are norms and principles consonant with critical environmental threats. To promote alternative normative goals -- e.g., human security through an economy that respects natural limits, an economy that is sensitive to overconsumption -- the focus must change from producing goods (goods are good so more goods must be better) to consumption, not just purchasing, so-called "demand," but to consuming*,* using up, diminishing regenerative capacity, engendering irreversibilities and non-substitutabilities. n3 Global water management illustrates the need for such a focus.

#### Consumption is the root cause of the Affirmative harms and constitutes a systemic harm that not only outweighs the case, but creates the possibility of extinction

Dauvergne, 5 (Peter, “Dying of Consumption: Accidents or Sacrifices of Global Morality?” Global Environmental Politics, August)

Private consumption expenditures are now more than 4 times higher than in 1960. The globalization of ever-more growth and consumption has come, however, at a price: global chains of cause-and-effect that obscure social, environmental and ethical responsibility. The result in practice is a global order that accepts the deaths of millions of young people in dangerous and unhealthy environments as tragic, but largely unavoidable, accidents of economic progress. The history of what most call traffic "accidents" is revealing. The hope at the 1896 inquest into the first "accidental death" was this would never happen again. But hope is not action. Today, traffic injures as many as 50 million and kills over one million people ever year. It is, however, no accident that tragedies like these are "accidents" rather than "sacrifices," as such language softens criticism of the moral, social and ecological crises arising from the current global consumptive order. Tales of the miracles of modern science could fill all of the world's cathedrals. Just four decades ago, to choose a random example, South African surgeon Christiaan Barnard performed the first human heart transplant on Louis Washkansky, turning the tragic death of 25-year old Denise Ann Darvall by a speeding car into what the December 1967 issue of Time magazine called her "great favor to humanity." n1 Who, meeting Mr. Washkansky days later, could dispute the wonders of our collective progress? Yet, in a world where surgeons now routinely transplant hearts, on average 19 children under the age of five still die every minute from preventable and treatable causes -- ticking to a grim total of over 10 million every year. Unhealthy environments aggravate illnesses that kill nearly half of these children each year. n2 Diarrhea alone kills more than one-and-a half million children a year. n3 Each year, millions of people also die violently: in 2000, there were over 800,000 suicides, 500,000 homicides and 300,000 deaths in wars. n4 The biggest cause of violent deaths, however, is the one behind Denise Darvall's favor to humanity: traffic collisions, which kill over one million people a year. . Why, with so many medical and technical advances over the last few decades, do so many people still die prematurely? Is it genetic fate? Or bad luck? No doubt some of these deaths are beyond our control, a simple result of living. Far too often, though, the direct causes are from utterly unnecessary dangers -- avoidable "accidents" or curable diseases. Why, it seems reasonable to inquire, are polities unable or unwilling to create safer environments for the world's young? Is this not the moral duty of mature adults? Should this not transcend religion? Ethnicity? Nationality? Sovereignty? The explanation for our collective failure, I think, lies not with the behavior of a few callous politicians and corporate executives. Such actions are mere symptoms of a system-wide failure. The explanation lies instead in the processes and structures of a globalizing political economy of ever-rising consumption. This economy feeds the luxuries of a wealthy minority by degrading the environments of the poor majority -- making these environments unsafe and unhealthy. It disproportionately transfers the ecological costs and social risks to vulnerable peoples and places (including consuming resources essential for the wellbeing of future generations). And it justifies a world where global governance focuses on the needs of capitalism and national security rather than on the safety of those truly at risk of dying young. The result in practice is a global morality that treats the loss of millions of young people every year as little more than tragic accidents, inevitable, natural even, a Darwinian outcome of choice, circumstance, and, ultimately, economic growth. These consequences are, in a possibly blasphemous metaphor muddling the language of the past and present, the sacrifices to the gods of progress in an era of globalization. There is, however, a reason we call these consequences "accidents" rather than "sacrifices," as such soft language helps avoid taking a hard look at the guts of global morality in an era of consumptive prosperity.

#### Reject the way the 1AC frames the problem in favor of an interrogation of consumptive practices — before we can go about fixing the world, we have to start off with an examination of the self, and how we are all personally implicated.

Nayar, 99 (Jayan, Warwick Law, Transnational Law & Contemporary Problems, Fall)

Rightly, we are concerned with the question of what can be done to alleviate the sufferings that prevail. But there are necessary prerequisites to answering the "what do we do?" question. We must first ask the intimately connected questions of "about what?" and "toward what end?" These questions, obviously, impinge on our vision and judgment. When we attempt to imagine transformations toward preferred human futures, we engage in the difficult task of judging the present. This is difficult not because we are oblivious to violence or that we are numb to the resulting suffering, but because, outrage with "events" of violence aside, processes of violence embroil and implicate our familiarities in ways that defy the simplicities of straightforward imputability. Despite our best efforts at categorizing violence into convenient compartments--into "disciplines" of study and analysis such as "development" and "security" (health, environment, population, being other examples of such compartmentalization) -- the encroachments of order(ing) function at more pervasive levels. And without doubt, the perspectives of the observer, commentator, and actor become crucial determinants. It is necessary, I believe, to question this, "our," perspective, to reflect upon a perspective of violence which not only locates violence as a happening "out there" while we stand as detached observers and critics, but is also one in which we are ourselves implicated in the violence of ordered worlds where we stand very much as participants. For this purpose of a critique of critique, it is necessary to consider the "technologies" of ordering

### Warming

#### Biofuels can’t solve warming – they harm the environment more than fossil fuels and there’s tons of alt causes

Farrow, 7 – reporter for the Guardian, citing Dr. Renton Righelato of the World Land Trust (Tristan, “Biofuels switch a mistake, say researchers,” The Guardian, 8/16/2007, http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/aug/17/climatechange.energy) // bghs-ms

Increasing production of biofuels to combat climate change will release between two and nine times more carbon gases over the next 30 years than fossil fuels, according to the first comprehensive analysis of emissions from biofuels. Biofuels - petrol and diesel extracted from plants - are presented as an environmentally friendly alternative to fossil fuels because the crops absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere as they grow. The study warns that forests must not be cleared to make way for biofuel crops. Clearing forests produces an immediate release of carbon gases into the atmosphere, accompanied by a loss of habitats, wildlife and livelihoods, the researchers said. Britain is committed to substituting 10% of its transport fuel with biofuels under Europewide plans to slash carbon emissions by 2020. "Biofuel policy is rushing ahead without understanding the implications," said Renton Righelato of the World Land Trust, a conservation charity. "It is a mistake in climate change terms to use biofuels." Dr Righelato's study, with Dominick Spracklen from the University of Leeds, is the first to calculate the impact of biofuel carbon emissions across the whole cycle of planting, extraction and conversion into fuel. They report in the journal Science that between two and nine times more carbon emissions are avoided by trapping carbon in trees and forest soil than by replacing fossil fuels with biofuels. Around 40% of Europe's agricultural land would be needed to grow biofuel crops to meet the 10% fossil fuel substitution target. That demand on arable land cannot be met in the EU or the US, say the scientists, so is likely to shift the burden on land in developing countries. The National Farmers Union said 20% of Britain's agricultural land could be used to grow biofuels by 2010. However, the researchers say reforesting the land would be a better way to reduce emissions. Biofuels look good in climate change terms from a Western perspective, said Dr Spracklen, but globally they actually lead to higher carbon emissions. "Brazil, Paraguay, Indonesia among others have huge deforestation programmes to supply the world biofuel market", he said. The researchers say the emphasis should be placed on increasing the efficiency of fossil fuel use and moving to carbon-free alternatives such as renewable energy.

#### Renewables can’t solve warming—they’re not a replacement

Angus 12– ecosocialist advocate, citing an extensive study by Richard York, professor at the University of Oregon with an MS in Environmental Studies from Bemidji State University (Iran, “Green energy won’t save the earth without social change”, 3/21/12; < http://climateandcapitalism.com/2012/03/21/green-energy-alone-wont-save-the-earth/>)//Beddow

The most popular techno-fix for global warming is green energy. If energy companies would only deploy wind, hydro, solar, geothermal or nuclear, then emission-intensive fossil fuels will eventually disappear. But will that actually work? A new study by Richard York of the University of Oregon shows that it isn’t that simple. Rather than displacing fossil fuels, green energy sources have proven to be mostly additive. “Do alternative energy sources displace fossil fuels?” published this month in Nature Climate Change, discusses what happened when alternative energy sources were introduced in countries around the world, over the past fifty years. Contrary to the accepted wisdom that new green energy replaces fossil-fuel use, York found that on average each unit of energy use from non-fossil-fuel sources displaced less than a quarter of a unit of energy use from fossil-fuel sources. The picture is worse with electricity, where each new unit generated from green sources displaced less than one-tenth of a unit of fossil-fuel-generated electricity. York writes: “Based on all of the results presented above, the answer to the question presented in the title of this paper – do alternative energy sources displace fossil fuels? – is yes, but only very modestly. The common assumption that the expansion of production of alternative energy will suppress fossil-fuel energy production in equal proportion is clearly wrong.” Why don’t the new sources replace the old? York identifies two key reasons: the inertia of a huge existing fossil-fuel infrastructure, and the power and influence of the coal and oil corporations. “The failure of non-fossil energy sources to displace fossil ones is probably in part attributable to the established energy system where there is a lock-in to using fossil fuels as the base energy source because of their long-standing prevalence and existing infrastructure and to the political and economic power of the fossil-fuel industry.” In other words, eliminating fossil-fuel as an energy source is at least as much a social and political problem as a technical one. “Of course all societies need energy. So, obviously, if societies are to stop using fossil fuels they must have other energy sources. However, the results from the analyses presented here indicate that the shift away from fossil fuel does not happen inevitably with the expansion of non-fossil-fuel sources, or at least in the political and economic contexts that have been dominant over the past fifty years around the world…. “The most effective strategy for curbing carbon emissions is likely to be one that aims to not only develop non-fossil energy sources, but also to find ways to alter political and economic contexts so that fossil-fuel energy is more easily displaced and to curtail the growth in energy consumption as much as possible. “A general implication of these findings is that polices aimed at addressing global climate change should not focus principally on developing technological fixes, but should also take into account human behaviour in the context of political, economic and social systems.” The evidence shows that simply introducing green energy isn’t enough: the introduction must be accompanied by “explicit policies aimed at reducing carbon emissions.” The article is published in a scientific journal, where political and social conclusions can only be expressed in muted form. But Richard York’s research and conclusions reinforce the argument that he and his co-authors (John Bellamy Foster and Brett Clark) made more explicitly in their recent book, The Ecological Rift: Capitalism’s War on the Planet. “We are confronting the question of a terminal crisis, threatening most life on the planet, civilization, and the very existence of future generations. … attempts to solve this through technological fixes, market magic, and the idea of a ‘sustainable capitalism’ are mere forms of ecological denial, since they ignore the inherent destructiveness of the current system of unsustainable development – capitalism.”

China makes the impact inevitable and they don’t model

Downs, 8

Eric, Fellow @ Brookings, China Energy Fellow, Foreign Policy, John L. Thornton China Center U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission, China’s Energy Policies and Their Environmental Impacts, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0813\_china\_downs.aspx

China suffers from a disconnect between the increasingly prominent position of energy issues on its domestic and foreign policy agendas and the capacity of the country’s institutions to manage the energy sector. Some Chinese commentators have even argued that the biggest threat to China’s energy security is posed by the very institutions responsible for enhancing it. Consequently, restructuring China’s energy policymaking apparatus has been a subject of intense debate in recent years as the country has grappled with an unexpected surge in energy demand, growing dependence on energy imports, rising global energy prices and periodic domestic energy supply shortages. Authority over China’s energy sector at the national level is fractured among more than a dozen government agencies, the most important of which is the National Development and Reform Commission (NDRC). Within the NDRC itself, responsibility for energy is similarly scattered among multiple departments. Prior to the restructuring in March 2008, the key component was the Energy Bureau, which had a broad mandate but lacked the authority, tools and manpower to fulfill it. In 2005, the government added another cook to the kitchen with the establishment of the National Energy Leading Group, an advisory body headed by Premier Wen Jiabao. While the leading group’s creation reflected recognition of the need to strengthen energy sector management, it did not eradicate China’s energy governance woes. China’s fragmented energy policymaking structure has impeded energy governance because there is no single institution, such as a Ministry of Energy, with the authority to coordinate the interests of the various stakeholders. For example, the implementation of energy laws is hampered by the fact that those laws often do not specify the government agencies responsible for implementation because of disputes over who should be in charge. Similarly, the fuel tax that the NPC approved in 1999 has not been implemented because of the failure of the relevant stakeholders to reach an agreement. The policy paralysis within the energy bureaucracy stands in sharp contrast to the activism of China’s state-owned energy companies. These firms are powerful and relatively autonomous actors. Their influence is derived from their full and vice ministerial ranks, the membership of some top executives in the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, industry expertise, internationally listed subsidiaries and profitability (at least until recently). More often than not, it is China’s energy firms who initiate major energy projects and policies that are later embraced by the government, such as the West-East Pipeline and the acquisition of foreign energy assets. The companies also have some capacity to advance corporate interests at the expense of national ones. For example, oil and power generating companies have periodically reduced their output to pressure the government to raise the state-set prices of refined products and electricity, which have not kept pace with increases in the market-determined prices of crude oil and coal. Similarly, China’s national oil companies have ignored guidance from the central government about where they should invest overseas. II. China’s “new” energy policymaking structure The recent changes to China’s energy policymaking apparatus are the latest in a series of institutional reforms aimed at improving energy governance. In March 2008, the NPC approved two additions to China’s energy bureaucracy – the State Energy Commission (SEC) and the National Energy Administration (NEA). The SEC, a high-level discussion and coordination body whose specific functions, organization and staffing have not yet been determined, will replace the National Energy Leading Group. The daily affairs of the SEC will be handled by the NEA, a vice-ministerial component of the NDRC, which is the successor to the NDRC’s Energy Bureau. In addition to the Energy Bureau, the NEA is also comprised of other energy offices from the NDRC, the Office of the National Leading Group, and the nuclear power administration of the Commission of Science, Technology and Industry for National Defense. The NEA has a broad mandate, which includes managing the country’s energy industries, drafting energy plans and policies, negotiating with international energy agencies and approving foreign energy investments. The NEA, like its predecessor, will struggle to fulfill its mandate because it lacks the authority, autonomy, manpower and tools to deal with the country’s energy challenges. Although the NEA’s capabilities in each of these areas are greater than those possessed by the NDRC Energy Bureau, they still fall short of what the NEA needs to do its job. Authority: The NEA has more political clout than its predecessor, but not enough to mitigate the bureaucratic infighting that undermines energy decision-making. The NEA is a vice-ministerial body, which is a step above that of the Energy Bureau, which was a bureau-level organization. However, the NEA still does not have the authority it needs to coordinate the interests of ministries, commissions and state-owned energy companies. One of the frustrations of officials in the NDRC Energy Bureau was that the energy companies often undercut their authority by circumventing the Bureau to hold face-to-face discussions with China’s senior leadership. The authority of the NEA is somewhat enhanced by the appointment of Zhang Guobao, a Vice-Chairman of the NDRC with full ministerial rank, as head of the NEA. While it was widely expected that Zhang would retire, his new position is a reflection of his substantial energy expertise. Zhang, who has worked at the NDRC since 1983, is a smart and skillful bureaucrat with encyclopedic knowledge of China’s energy sector. He has overseen the development of some of the country’s major infrastructure projects, including the West-East Pipeline, the transmission of electricity from west to east, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and the expansion of Beijing Capital International Airport. Autonomy: The NEA is a creature of the NDRC. Some Chinese media reports speculated that the fact that the NEA’s offices will be separate from those of the NDRC and that the NEA will have its own Party Group – which will give the NEA greater autonomy in managing its affairs, including personnel decisions – are signs of the NEA’s independence. However, the fact that Zhang Guobao – an NDRC “lifer” – is head of the NEA and its Party Group indicates that the NEA’s room to maneuver will be constrained by the NDRC. Moreover, the NEA’s independence is limited by the fact that key tools it needs to effectively manage the energy sector are in the hands of the NDRC. Tools: Arguably the greatest constraint on the NEA’s ability to fulfill its mandate is the fact that is does not possess the authority to set energy prices, which remain the purview of the NDRC’s Pricing Department. The issue of who would end up with the power to determine energy prices was, in the words of Zhang Guobao, a subject of “constant dispute” during the bureaucratic reorganization. Although the NEA can make suggestions about energy price adjustments and should be consulted by the NDRC on any proposed changes, the shots are still being called by the NDRC (and ultimately the State Council, whose approval is needed for any major energy price changes). The fact that the NDRC retained control over energy prices is hardly surprising. The power to set prices is one of the NDRC’s main instruments of macroeconomic control, which it understandably is reluctant to relinquish, especially to a subordinate component which might be tempted to adjust energy prices in ways that run counter to broader NDRC objectives, such as combating inflation. The NEA’s lack of authority over energy prices makes its task of mitigating the current electricity shortages, which are partly rooted in price controls, especially challenging. Electricity prices are set by the state, while coal prices are determined by the market. The failure of electricity price increases to keep pace with soaring coal prices has contributed to the national power shortage because some electricity producers can't afford coal while others are unwilling to operate at a loss. With no pricing power, the NEA has little choice but to resort to administrative measures to achieve an objective that would be more effectively realized by raising and ultimately liberalizing electricity prices. Personnel: The central government is still managing the energy sector with a skeleton crew. Contrary to rumors that the NEA’s staff would be as large as 200, it ended up with just 112 people. This staff quota is certainly larger than that of the NDRC Energy Bureau, which had only 50 people, but it does not represent a major increase in the number of people directly involved in managing the energy sector at the national level. Moreover, some Chinese media reports have speculated that the NEA may face the problem of “too many generals and not enough soldiers” because at least half of the 112 slots at the NEA are for positions at the deputy department head level and above. The Party organ that determines the functions, internal structure and staff quotas for government institutions probably resisted calls for more personnel out of concern that if it approved a large staff for the NEA, then other government bodies would also press for more manpower at a time when the State Council is trying to streamline the bureaucracy. In sum, China’s new energy administration is unlikely to substantially improve energy governance. The organizational changes are tantamount to rearranging deck chairs on the Titanic. Although the energy bureaucracy looks a bit different, its limited capacities remain largely unchanged. Consequently, we can expect to see a continuation of business as usual: conflicts of interest will impede decision-making; the energy companies will remain important drivers of projects and policies; state-set energy prices will continue to contribute to periodic domestic energy supply shortfalls; and the NEA, with no authority to adjust energy prices, probably will resort to “second best” administrative measures to try to eradicate those shortages. The modest tinkering to China’s energy policymaking apparatus unveiled during the March 2008 NPC meeting reflects the conflicts of interest that stymie energy decision-making. Despite widespread recognition among Chinese officials and energy experts of the need to get the country’s energy institutions “right” and the growing chorus of voices calling for the establishment of a Ministry of Energy (MOE), there are powerful ministerial and corporate interests that favor the status quo. The opposition to the creation of a MOE, a hot topic of debate in Chinese energy circles in recent years, was led by the NDRC and the state-owned energy companies. The mere specter of a MOE strikes fear in the heart of the NDRC because it would deprive the NDRC of a substantial portion of its portfolio and important tools of macroeconomic control. The NDRC’s aversion is shared by the energy firms who are reluctant to have another political master and afraid that a MOE would limit their direct access to China’s leadership. Such opposition helps explain why the government was unable to forge a consensus in favor of more robust changes to China’s energy policymaking apparatus. Implications for the United States First, US policymakers should recognize that China’s fractured energy policymaking apparatus may constrain the Chinese government from doing all that US policymakers would like it to do – and indeed what Chinese leaders themselves might want to do – to enhance international energy security and combat climate change. If China falls short of our expectations it may not reflect a conscious decision by Beijing to shirk its global responsibilities but rather the limited capacity of its national energy institutions to bend other actors, notably firms and local governments, to its will.

China key to solving emissions

Chen et al., 10Chen, Qian, Peridas, Qiu, Ho: Natural Resources Defense Council, Friedmann: Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Li, Wei: Institute of Rock and Soil Mechanics, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Sung, Fowler: Clean Air Task Force, Seligsohn, Liu, Forbes: World Resources Institute, Zhang: China Tsinghua University, Zhao: Institute of Engineering Thermophysics, Chinese Academy of Sciences (Jason Chen, Jingjing Qian, George Peridas, Yueming Qiu, Bruce Ho, Julio Friedmann, Xiaochun Li, Ning Wei, S. Ming Sung, Mike Fowler, Deborah Seligsohn, Yue Liu, Sarah Forbes, Dongjie Zhang, Lifeng Zhao, December 2010, “Identifying Near-Term Opportunities For Carbon Capture and Sequestration (CCS) in China,” <http://docs.nrdc.org/international/files/int_10121001a.pdf)//DR>. H

Coal—the most carbon-laden of the three major fossil fuels (i.e., natural gas, crude oil, and coal)—supplies nearly 70 percent of China’s energy. China’s heavy reliance on this fuel is reflected by the fact that during the last five years the country has accounted for nearly fourfifths of the global growth in coal consumption.8 In 2008, China consumed more coal than North and South America, the European Union, Russia, the Middle East, and Africa combined (see Figure 2.1). Heavy reliance on coal has sharply driven up China’s CO2 emissions. In 1994, China emitted 3.07 billion tons, or gigatons (Gt), of CO2. A decade later, in 2004, China’s CO2 emissions stood 60 percent higher, at over 5 Gt a year.9 As a result, China’s annual CO2 emissions now exceed those of the United States.10 With its CO2 emissions surging nearly eight times faster than in the rest of the world (see Figure 2.2), China has a pivotal role to play in the global effort to prevent the worst impacts of global warming from occurring.11

#### Warming inevitable even if we cut emissions to zero—multiple studies confirm

Gillett et al. 10—director @ the Canadian Centre for Climate Modelling and Analysis

Nathan, “Ongoing climate change following a complete cessation of carbon dioxide emissions”. *Nature Geoscience*

Several recent studies have demonstrated that CO2-induced 17 global mean temperature change is irreversible on human 18 timescales1\_5. We find that not only is this climate change 19 irreversible, but that for some climate variables, such as Antarctic 20 temperature and North African rainfall, CO2-induced climate 21 changes are simulated to continue to worsen for many centuries 22 **even after a complete cessation of emissions.** Although it is 23 also well known that a large committed thermosteric sea level 24 rise is expected even after a cessation of emissions in 2100, 25 our finding of a strong delayed high-latitude Southern Ocean 26 warming at intermediate depths suggests that this effect may be 27 compounded by ice shelf collapse, grounding line retreat, and ensuing accelerated ice discharge in marine-based sectors of the 28 Antarctic ice sheet, precipitating a sea level rise of several metres. 29 Quantitative results presented here are subject to uncertainties 30 associated with the climate sensitivity, the rate of ocean heat 31 uptake and the rate of carbon uptake in CanESM1, but our 32 findings of Northern Hemisphere cooling, Southern Hemisphere 33 warming, a southward shift of the intertropical convergence zone, 34 and delayed and ongoing ocean warming at intermediate depths 35 following a cessation of emissions are likely to be robust. Geo- 36 engineering by stratospheric aerosol injection has been proposed 37 as a response measure in the event of a rapid melting of the 38 West Antarctic ice sheet24. Our results indicate that if such a 39 melting were driven by ocean warming at intermediate depths, as 40 is thought likely, a geoengineering response would be ineffective 41 for several centuries owing to the long delay associated with 42 subsurface ocean warming.

#### Environmental apocalypticism causes eco-authoritarianism and mass violence against those deemed environmental threats – also causes political apathy which turns case

**Buell 3** (Frederick Buell, cultural critic on the environmental crisis and a Professor of English at Queens College and the author of five books; “From Apocalypse To Way of Life,” pg. 185-186)

Looked at critically, then, **crisis discourse** thus suffers from a number of liabilities. First, it seems to have become a **political liability** almost as much as an asset. It calls up a **fierce and effective opposition** with its predictions; worse, its more specific predictions are all too **vulnerable to refutation by events**. It also **exposes environmentalists to being called grim doomsters** and antilife Puritan extremists. Further, concern with crisis has all too often tempted people to try to find a “**total solution**” to the problems involved— a phrase that, as an astute analyst of the limitations of crisis discourse, John Barry, puts it, is all too reminiscent of the Third Reich’s infamous “**final solution**.”55 A total crisis of society—environmental crisis at its gravest—threatens to translate despair into **inhumanist authoritarianism**; more often, however, it helps keep merely dysfunctional authority in place. It thus leads, Barry suggests, to the belief that only elite- and expert-led solutions are possible.56 At the same timeit **depoliticizes people**, inducing them to accept their impotence as individuals; this is something that has made many people today feel, ironically and/or passively, that since it makes no difference at all what any individual does on his or her own, one might as well go along with it. Yet another pitfall for the full and sustained elaboration of environmental crisis is, though least discussed, perhaps the most deeply ironic. A problem with deep cultural and psychological as well as social effects, it is embodied in a startlingly simple proposition: the worse one feels environmental crisis is, the more one is tempted to turn one’s back on the environment. This means, preeminently, turning one’s back on “nature”—on traditions of nature feeling, traditions of knowledge about nature (ones that range from organic farming techniques to the different departments of ecological science), and traditions of nature-based activism. If nature is thoroughly wrecked these days, **people need to delink from nature** and live in postnature—a conclusion that, as the next chapter shows, many in U.S. society drew at the end of the millenium. Explorations of how deeply “nature” has been wounded and how intensely vulnerable to and dependent on human actions it is can thus lead, ironically, to **further indifference** to nature-based environmental issues, not greater concern with them. But what quickly becomes evident to any reflective consideration of the difficulties of crisis discourse is that all of these liabilities are in fact bound tightly up with one specific notion of environmental crisis—with 1960s- and 1970s-style environmental apocalypticism. Excessive concern about them does not recognize that crisis discourse as a whole has significantly changed since the 1970s. They remain inducements to look away from serious reflection on environmental crisis only if one does not explore how environmental crisis has turned of late from apocalypse to dwelling place. The apocalyptic mode had a number of prominent features: it was preoccupied with running out and running into walls; with scarcity and with the imminent rupture of limits; with actions that promised and temporally predicted imminent total meltdown; and with (often, though not always) the need for immediate “**total solution**.” **Thus doomsterism was its reigning mode; eco-authoritarianism** was a grave temptation; and as crisis was elaborated to show more and more severe deformations of nature, temptation increased to refute it, or give up, or even cut off ties to clearly terminal “nature.”

#### That makes intervention and mass war inevitable

Brzoska 8 (Michael Brzoska, Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg; “The securitization of climate change and the power of conceptions of security,” Paper prepared for the International Studies Association Convention, 2008)

In the literature on securitization it is implied that when a problem is securitized it is difficult to limit this to an increase in attention and resources devoted to mitigating the problem (Brock 1997, Waever 1995). Securitization regularly leads to all-round ‘exceptionalism’ in dealing with the issue as well as to a shift in institutional localization towards ‘security experts’ (Bigot 2006), such as the military and police. Methods and instruments associated with these security organizations – such as more use of arms, force and violence – will gain in importance in the discourse on ‘what to do’. A good example of securitization was the period leading to the Cold War (Guzzini 2004 ). Originally a political conflict over the organization of societies, in the late 1940s, the East-West confrontation became an existential conflict that was overwhelmingly addressed with military means, including the potential annihilation of humankind. Efforts to alleviate the political conflict were, throughout most of the Cold War, secondary to improving military capabilities. Climate change could meet a similar fate. An essentially political problem concerning the distribution of the costs of prevention and adaptation and the losses and gains in income arising from change in the human environment might be perceived as intractable, thus necessitating the build-up of military and police forces to prevent it from becoming a major security problem. The portrayal of climate change as a security problem could, in particular, cause the richer countries in the global North, which are less affected by it, to strengthen measures aimed at protecting them from the spillover of violent conflict from the poorer countries in the global South that will be most affected by climate change. It could also be used by major powers as a justification for improving their military preparedness against the other major powers, thus leading to arms races.

#### Their apocalyptic warming focus trades off with environmentalism – turns its own end

**Crist, 7** (Eileen Crist, 2007, “Beyond the Climate Crisis: A Critique of Climate Change Discourse”, http://journal.telospress.com.proxy.lib.umich.edu/content/2007/141/29.full.pdf+html)

While the dangers of climate change are real, I argue that there are even greater dangers in representing it as the most urgent problem we face. Framing climate change in such a manner deserves to be challenged for two reasons: it encourages the restriction of proposed solutions to the technical realm, by powerfully insinuating that the needed approaches are those that directly address the problem; and it detracts attention from the planet’s ecological predicament as a whole, by virtue of claiming the limelight for the one issue that trumps all others. Identifying climate change as the biggest threat to civilization, and ushering it into center stage as the highest priority problem, has bolstered the proliferation of technical proposals that address the specific challenge. The race is on for figuring out what technologies, or portfolio thereof, will solve “the problem.” Whether the call is for reviving nuclear power, boosting the installation of wind turbines, using a variety of renewable energy sources, increasing the efficiency of fossil-fuel use, developing carbon-sequestering technologies, or placing mirrors in space to deflect the sun’s rays, the narrow character of such proposals is evident: confront the problem of greenhouse gas emissions by technologically phasing them out, superseding them, capturing them, or mitigating their heating effects. In his The Revenge of Gaia, for example, Lovelock briefly mentions the need to face climate change by “changing our whole style of living.”16 But the thrust of this work, what readers and policy-makers come away with, is his repeated and strident call for investing in nuclear energy as, in his words, “the one lifeline we can use immediately.”17 In the policy realm, the first step toward the technological fix for global warming is often identified with implementing the Kyoto protocol. Biologist Tim Flannery agitates for the treaty, comparing the need for its successful endorsement to that of the Montreal protocol that phased out the ozone-depleting CFCs. “The Montreal protocol,” he submits, “marks a signal moment in human societal development, representing the first ever victory by humanity over a global pollution problem.”18 He hopes for a similar victory for the global climate-change problem. Yet the deepening realization of the threat of climate change, virtually in the wake of stratospheric ozone depletion, also suggests that dealing with global problems treaty-by-treaty is no solution to the planet’s predicament. Just as the risks of unanticipated ozone depletion have been followed by the dangers of a long underappreciated climate crisis, so it would be naïve not to anticipate another (perhaps even entirely unforeseeable) catastrophe arising after the (hoped-for) resolution of the above two. Furthermore, if greenhouse gases were restricted successfully by means of technological shifts and innovations, the root cause of the ecological crisis as a whole would remain unaddressed. The destructive patterns of production, trade, extraction, land-use, waste proliferation, and consumption, coupled with population growth, would go unchallenged, continuing to run down the integrity, beauty, and biological richness of the Earth. Industrial-consumer civilization has entrenched a form of life that admits virtually no limits to its expansiveness within, and perceived entitlement to, the entire planet.19 But questioning this civilization is by and large sidestepped in climate-change discourse, with its single-minded quest for a global-warming techno-fix.20 Instead of confronting the forms of social organization that are causing the climate crisis—among numerous other catastrophes—climate-change literature often focuses on how global warming is endangering the culprit, and agonizes over what technological means can save it from impending tipping points.21 The dominant frame of climate change funnels cognitive and pragmatic work toward specifically addressing global warming, while muting a host of equally monumental issues. Climate change looms so huge ever 1964 work, an entire socio-cultural-economic life—from (actual or aspired to) ways of eating and lodging, transportation, entertainment, or emoting and thinking—“binds the consumers more or less pleasantly to the producers and, through the latter, to the whole.” Herbert Marcuse, One-Dimensional Man: Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial Society (Boston: Beacon, 1991), p. 12. Horkheimer and Adorno traced the origins of the collective’s participation in its own domination to the “historical” moment that magical control over nature (and over the deities of nature) was relinquished to a specific elite or clique in exchange for self and social preservation. Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno, Dialectic of Enlightenment, trans. John Cumming (New York: Continuum, 1972), pp. 21–22. After the decisive turn when the social body became implicated in its own domination, “what is done to all by the few, always occurs as the subjection of individuals by the many: social repression always exhibits the masks of repression by a collective” (ibid.). And elsewhere: “The misplaced love of the common people for the wrong which is done them is a greater force than the cunning of the authorities” (ibid., p. 134). In light of such astute observations offered by critical theorists, neo-Marxist and anarchist analyses that indict corporate and/or state power for the troubled natural and social worlds are, at best, only partially true. 20. More than thirty years ago, environmental philosopher Arne Naess articulated the influential distinction between “shallow” and “deep” ecology, characterized by the focus on symptoms of the environmental crisis, on the one hand, versus critical attention to underlying causes of problems, on the other. Notwithstanding its unfortunate elitist overtones—implying that some environmental thinkers are capable of reflecting deeply, while others flounder with superficialities—the shallow-deep distinction has been significant for two compelling reasons. One, it clarified how “symptomology” leads merely to technical piecemeal solutions; and two, it showed how underlying causes, left unaddressed, eventually generate more nasty symptoms. In other words, shallow ecological thinking is technical and narrow: when we think about climate change as “the problem”—as opposed to confronting the limitless expansionism of the capitalist enterprise as the problem—we arguably become shallow in our thinking. Arne Naess, “The Shallow and the Deep, Long- Range Ecology Movements,” in George Sessions, ed., Deep Ecology for the Twenty-First Century (1973; Boston: Shambhala, 1995), pp. 151–55. on the environmental and political agenda today that it has contributed to downplaying other facets of the ecological crisis: mass extinction of species, the devastation of the oceans by industrial fishing, continued old-growth deforestation, topsoil losses and desertification, endocrine disruption, incessant development, and so on, are made to appear secondary and more forgiving by comparison with “dangerous anthropogenic interference” with the climate system. In what follows, I will focus specifically on how climate-change discourse encourages the continued marginalization of the biodiversity crisis—a crisis that has been soberly described as a holocaust,22 and which despite decades of scientific and environmentalist pleas remains a virtual non-topic in society, the mass media, and humanistic and other academic literatures. Several works on climate change (though by no means all) extensively examine the consequences of global warming for biodiversity, 23 but rarely is it mentioned that biodepletion predates dangerous greenhouse-gas buildup by decades, centuries, or longer, and will not be stopped by a technological resolution of global warming. Climate change is poised to exacerbate species and ecosystem losses—indeed, is doing so already. But while technologically preempting the worst of climate change may temporarily avert some of those losses, such a resolution of the climate quandary will not put an end to—will barely address—the ongoing destruction of life on Earth.

#### Thesis claim: desire lacks as a result of the structure of language on the speaking organism – the aff is an attempt at providing a palliative to the ills of the social order which results only in scapegoating and political failure

Edkins 3 (Jenny, U of Wales Aberystwyth, Trauma and the Memory of Politics, p. 11-14)//LA \*\*\*Pronoun replacements by ||| in the text.

In the psychoanalytic account the subject is formed around a lack, and in the face of trauma. We become who we are by finding our place within the social order and family structures into which we are born. That social order is produced in symbolic terms, through language. Language does not just name things that are already there in the world. Language divides up the world in particular ways to produce for every social grouping what it calls 'reality'. Each language - each symbolic or social order has its own way of doing this. Crucially, none of these |||social orders||| are complete; none of them can find a place for everything. This is a logical limitation, not a question of a symbolic or social order being insufficiently developed. Completeness or closure is impossible. There is always, inevitably, something that is missed out, something that cannot be symbolised, and this is one part of what psychoanalytic theory calls 'the real'. In its birth into the symbolic or social order, into language, the subject is formed around, and through a veiling of, that which cannot be symbolized the traumatic real. The real is traumatic, and has to be hidden or forgotten, because it is a threat to the imaginary completeness of the subject. The 'subject' only exists in as far as the person finds their place within the social or symbolic order. But no place that the person occupies as a mother, friend, consumer, activistcan fully express what that person is. There is always something more. Again, this is not a question of people not fitting into the roles available for them and a call for more person-friendly societies. Nor does it concern multiple or fragmented identities in a postmodern world. It is a matter of a structural impossibility. If someone is, say, a political activist, there is always the immediate question of whether they are sufficiently involved to count as an activist: don't activists have to be more committed, to take part in more than just demonstrations, shouldn't they stand for office? On the other hand, are they perhaps more than an activist does that description do justice to what they are, to their role in the party? There is always an excess, a surplus, in one direction or the other. However, we choose on the whole to ignore this - to forget this impossibility, and to act as if completeness and closure were possible. We hide the traumatic real, and stick with the fantasy of what we call social reality. As I have argued elsewhere, the political is that which enjoins us not to forget the traumatic real but rather to acknowledge the constituted and provisional nature of what we call social reality. Politics refers to the sphere of activity and institutions that is called 'politics' as opposed to 'economics' or 'society'. Politics is part of what we call social reality. It exists within the agendas and frameworks that are already accepted within the social order. The political, in its 'properly traumatic dimension', on the other hand, concerns the real. It refers to events in which politics of the first sort and its institutions are brought into being. This can be the day-to-day production and reproduction of the social and symbolic order. This continual process has to take place; the social order is not natural, it doesn't exist unless it is produced continually. The political also takes place at moments when major upheavals occur that replace a preceding social and legal system and set up a new order in its place. At such points, the symbolism and ideology that concealed the fragile and contingent nature of authority collapse altogether and there is a brief interregnum before the new order imposes a different form of concealment. The way that time figures in the psychoanalytic account is interesting. A certain non-linearity is evident: time no longer moves unproblematically from past through present to future. In a sense, subjects only retrospectively become what they already are - they only ever will have been. And the social order too shares this retroactive constitution. The subject and the social order in which the subject finds a place are both in a continual process of becoming. Neither exists as a fixed entity in the present moment, as the common-sense view in western culture mightlead us to expect. Both are always in the process of formation. This is because the two are so intimately related. The person is formed, not through a process of interaction with the social order (since that would mean thinking of the social as already there), but by imagining or supposing that the social order exists. This supposing by the individual is what brings the social into being. We have to imagine that others will respond to us before we speak, but it is only our speaking, of course, that enables them to respond. But supposing that the social exists does not only produce the social order, it also, simultaneously, brings the individual into existence too. When our speaking elicits a response, we recognise ourselves as subjects in that response. This recognition is belated when viewed through the lens of a linear temporality: it is not at the moment we decide to speak that we see who we are, but only a moment later, when we get a response. The response tells us not who we are now, since we are no longer that - we have already changed. It tells us who we were, at the moment when we spoke. This is the sense in which we never are, we only ever will hazy been. Like the distant stars, whose past we know from the light that has taken millions of years to reach us but whose present we can only guess at, we can only know what we were, not what we are. And even that is also a guess, of course. In a similar way, when we listen to a sentence being spoken, we can predict what is being said, but we cannot be sure we were right until the sentence is completed and over. Some forms of speech - rhetoric and jokes for example - play on that unpredictability. The uncertainty and unpredictability that this involves can be unsettling. In the rational west, we tend to seek certainty and security above all. We don't like not knowing. So we pretend that we do. Or that if we don't we could, given sufficient scientific research effort and enough money. We forget the uncertainties involved and adopt a view that what we call social reality - which Slavoj Zizek calls social fantasy -- is basically knowable. We adopt an ontology– a view of being and the nature of things - that depends on a progressive linear notion of time. Things can 'be' in our modern western sense only in the context of this temporality. They 'are' because they have a history in time, but they are at the same time separate from that history. But central to this solution to doubt is forgetting, as we have seen. The fantasy is only convincing if, once it has been put in place, we can forget that it is a fantasy. What we are forgetting some would say deliberately - is the real, that which cannot be symbolised, and that which is produced as an excess or surplus by any attempt at symbolisation. We do not remember the trauma that lies at the root of subjectivity, the lack or gap that remains, even within what we call social reality. This position leads to a depoliticisation. We forget that a complete, non-antagonistic society is impossible. We strive for completion and closure, often at any price. There are a number of ways in which this is done, according to Zizek.'' The first is communitarian attempts to produce a close homogeneous society arche-politics. Political struggle disappears because everyone agrees on everything. 'The second, most common in the liberal west, Zizek calls para-politics. Here the political is replaced by politics. Standardised competition takes place between accepted political parties according to pre-set rules, the prize being a turn at executive control of the state bureaucracy. Politics has become policing or managerial control. In the third meta-politics, political conflict is seen as a shadow theatre, with the important events taking place in another scene, that of economic processes. Politics should be cancelled when economic processes have worked themselves out (as scientific materialism predicts) and matters can be decided by rational debate and the collective will. Finally, we have ultra-politics, where political struggle becomes warfare, and the military are called in. There is no common ground for debate and politics is militarised. If we are to resist such attempts to 'gentrify' or depoliticise the political we have to recall the constituted, provisional and historically contingent nature of every social order, of every ontology. This position, which Zizek calls 'traversing the fantasy', 'tarrying with the negative' or fidelity to the ontological crack in the universe, is uncomfortable." It involves an acceptance of the lack of trauma at the centre of the subject and the non-existence of any complete, closed social order.

#### This only perpetuates university discourse – actually prevents action to “solve” warming, whatever that means

Bryant 13 (Levi R., Collin College, TX, The Intentional Stance and the Functional Stance, 9/18/13, http://larvalsubjects.wordpress.com/2013/09/18/the-intentional-stance-and-the-functional-stance/)//LA

Do we need to believe in anthropogenic climate change? I pose this question, of course, to be provocative as I do think it’s useful to believe in things like anthropogenic climate change. However, the point of posing the question is to draw attention to how a lot of us academics think and what intellectual movements such as actor-network theory and the new materialisms and realisms might bring to the table at the level of political strategy. A lot of us seem to think that our political work consists in persuading others to believe certain things. People must be persuaded to believe that neoliberal economic philosophy pervades all aspects of contemporary life (true). People must be persuaded to believe that current climate change is caused by human activity (true). Etc., etc., etc. The idea seems to be that if people have the right theory about the world or the correct set of propositional attitudes, then they’ll modify their action accordingly and do the right thing. Let’s call this the intentional attitude. The premise of the intentional attitude or intentionalism is that since action is based on belief or propositional attitudes, persuasion is a key component of political activism. The intentional attitude can be contrasted with the functional attitude. The functional attitude doesn’t deny that people have intentions and that these intentions play a significant role in why they do what they do, but it notes that functionally much of what our action produces has very little to do with what we intend in our action. For example, as I write this post I intend to persuade and convey certain ideas; however, functionally I am also contributing to the reproduction of the English language (and am probably making it worse!). When I go to the supermarket to get food for dinner I do so because I intend to feed myself, but I am also contributing to the reproduction of agrocapitalism. A lot of work in Continental political thought is undertaken for the sake of various emancipatory projects (intentional stance), but because it ends up accessible only to other expert level academics it functionally just reproduces university discourse, the tenure system, and contributes to the publication of new journal issues. In Latour’s famous example, we slow down for the cement speed bump not because of any particular belief we have about speed laws, but because of how the speed bump functions. Things that happen at the level of functionality are independent of beliefs and intentions, but contribute to why we act as we do all the same. From a functional standpoint, let’s look at intentionalist strategies again. My strategy is to persuade my interlocutor that climate change is human caused so that they will take action against these causes and support things like reducing carbon emissions and whatnot. That’s my intention. But looks at what happens. Now a massive debate goes on between the climate change denier and the person defending anthropogenic climate change theories. The denier wins either way, because functionally we end up discussing the issue to death rather than taking action. In continuing to debate we’re still doing nothing even though that’s not our intention to debate.

### Ag

**Multiple alt causes to ag the aff can’t solve**

**Journal of Commerce, 12** ("Agriculture Trade a 'Risky Business'", April 16, Proquest) // NK

Analysts and economists at the U.S. Department of Agriculture are full of good news about sales prospects for U.S. farm goods. But high up in every glowing estimate is a reminder that agriculture markets are subject to whims and market changes at a moment's notice. Livestock, dairy and poultry exports are expected to reach record levels again in 2012, the USDA said in its latest export forecast report. There are issues, however, that could cloud that sunny forecast, such as the ongoing sanitary and phytosanitary trade issue, changes in overseas handling of mad cow restrictions, and the Chinese demand for dairy and pork products. Any export item is subject to economic realities, trade wars and sudden shifts in supply or demand. But with food and farm items, that list grows to include freezing weather, floods, recalls based on contamination, disease in animal populations, not to mention plant disease or viruses. Last July, New Zealand kiwifruit growers were riding high. In the 2011 shipping season, they filled 63 chartered reefer vessels as well as 7,000 reefer containers with more than 110 million trays of kiwifruit. During one frenetic day in June, Zespri delivered 160 refrigerated containers, containing 832,000 trays of kiwis, to the Port of Tauranga for export in a 12-hour period. At that time, the industry thought 2012 would be even better. Zespri Chairman John Loughlin told shareholders kiwifruit sales in China were up 27 percent and that sales there could grow from 10 million trays annually to 90 million, by increasing consumption per person to just 8.8 ounces each year. The market optimism is gone, at least for the next few years, as New Zealand kiwi growers discovered a vine disease known as PSA in major growing areas that has spread much more quickly than anticipated. As the first shipment of kiwifruit in 2012 left the Port of Tauranga in early April, Zespri had lowered its sales forecast to 95 million trays and sent a group of Maori business and cultural representatives to Japan, its largest market. In addition to a singing group and gifts of Maori carvings, the delegation will take to its top Japanese clients "a subtle message to stick with us" even though the PSA bacterial disease had infected orchards in New Zealand, according to reports in New Zealand newspapers. The industry has identified a new kiwifruit variety it hopes will be resistant to PSA. In the meantime, kiwifruit producers across the Southern Hemisphere hope to increase their exports and gain market share in key markets in Asia and Europe. Mad cow disease, swine flu, hoof and mouth disease and the avian flu have impacted markets in the U.S. and around the globe with trade implications lasting years. But sometimes, a foodborne illness crops up that can disrupt a market overnight though product recalls. Several years ago, every leaf of spinach on grocery store shelves and in restaurants was recalled in the U.S. It took weeks before the tainted product was traced back to a farm in Central California. In the meantime, the entire industry took a financial hit; a number of small farms and packing houses went out of business, even though they had handled none of the tainted product. Chiquita, which had acquired a domestic bagged salad business the year before the spinach outbreak, was forced to sell its famed Great White Fleet of refrigerated vessels because of the financial losses incurred from the spinach recall period. No spinach grown or marketed by Chiquita was ever linked to the outbreak. On its Web side, the Food and Drug Administration lists 20 food product recalls in the 30 days prior to April 5 this year. The most common reason for a recall is an undeclared ingredient that could cause an allergic reaction, but instances of salmonella and listeria monocytogenes are also listed. Weather can also have an unexpected effect, both on the supply and demand side. In 2011, freezing weather in Florida reduced the state's citrus harvest by millions of boxes and reduced U.S. exports of oranges, grapefruit and lemons. But last year, U.S. exporters of beef, pork and vegetables saw increased demand following the earthquake, tsunami and resulting radiation scare in Japan. Key production areas in Japan for the commodities were affected by the extreme climatic situation, and demand for imported food grew.

Their Bryce internal link says biofuel production in general results in shocks not just corn, means the aff still links

#### Belief in market solutions to hunger only entrenches poverty—while the aff results in more organic crops on the market, the poor are left without access

Sharma 2002 (Devinder Sharma is a food and trade policy analyst, author and a commentator. Among his recent works include two books: GATT to WTO: Seeds of Despair and In the Famine Trap. He also chairs the New Delhi-based Forum for Biotechnology & Food Security, “Voices from the South: The Third World Debunks Corporate Myths on Genetically Engineered Crops”)

The reality of hunger and malnutrition is too harsh to be even properly understood. Hunger cannot be removed by producing transgenic crops with genes for Vitamin A. Hunger cannot be addressed by providing mobile phones to the rural communities. Nor can it be eradicated by providing the poor and hungry with an “informed choice” of novel foods. Somehow, biotechnologists prefer to turn a blind eye to the ground realities, missing the realities from the commercial interests of the biotechnology industries. In their over-enthusiasm to promote an expensive technology at the cost of the poor, they have forgotten that biotechnology has the potential to further the great divide between the haves and have-nots. No policy directive can help in bridging this monumental gap. The twin engines of economic growth—the technological revolution and globalization—will only widen the existing gap. Biotechnology will, in reality, push more people in the hunger trap. With public attention and resources being diverted from the ground realities, hunger will only grow in the years to come.

It does not, however, mean that this writer is against technology. The wheels of technological develop- ment are essential for every society but have to be used in a way that helps promote human development. Technology cannot be blindly promoted in an obvious effort to bolster the industry’s interests. Ignoring food security in the name of ensuring “profit security” for the private companies, can further marginalize the gains, if any. And herein lies a grave danger.

While the political leadership and the development community is postponing till the year 2015 the task to halve the number of the world’s hungry, the scientific community too has found an easy escape route. At almost all the genetic engineering laboratories, whether in the North or in the South, the focus of research is on crops which will produce edible vaccines, address the problems of malnutrition or “hidden hunger” by incorporating genes for Vitamin A, iron, and other micro- nutrients. But what is not being realized is that if the global scientific and development community were to aim at eradicating hunger in the first place, there would be no “hidden hunger.”

Who will take on the biggest challenge of all times—the elimination of hunger—which forms the root cause of real poverty and the lopsided human development is an issue no one is willing to stick his or her neck out for. The monumental task to feed the hungry—and that too at a time when food grains are rotting—is eventually being left to the market forces. The underlying message is very clear: the poor and hungry will have to live on hope.

#### The status quo food crisis in directly linked to the logic of neoliberal–speculation and land grabbing proves

Houtart 11 (Francois, Belgian Marxist Sociologist, serves as an advisor to CETRI (Centre Tricontinental) a Belgian non-governmental organization which he founded in 1976, was awarded the UNESCO-Madanjeet Singh Prize for the Promotion of Tolerance and Non-Violence, “ FROM ‘COMMON GOODS’ TO THE ‘COMMON GOOD OF HUMANITY,” ROSA LUXEMBURG FOUNDATION BRUSSELS, NOVEMBER)

There are two aspects to the food crisis. One is a conjunction of short-term factors, the other is due to (structural) long term factors. The former can be seen in the sudden rise of food prices in 2007 and 2008. It is true that this can be attributed to several causes, such as dwindling reserves, but the main reason was speculative, with the production of agrofuels being partly responsible (maize-based ethanol in the United States). Thus over a period of two years, the price of wheat on the Chicago stock exchange rose by 100 per cent, maize by 98 per cent and ethanol by 80 per cent. During these years appreciable amounts of speculative capital moved from other sectors into investing in food production in the expectation of rapid and significant profits. As a consequence, according to the FAO director general, in each of the years 2008 and 2009 more than 50 million people fell below the poverty line, and the total number of those living in poverty rose to the unprecedented level of over one billion people. This was clearly the result of the logic of profits, the capitalist law of value. The second aspect is structural. Over the last few years there has been an expansion of monoculture, resulting in the concentration of land-holdings – in other words, a veritable reversal of land reform. Peasant and family agriculture is being destroyed all over the world on the pretext of its low productivity. It is true that monoculture can produce from 500 and even 1,000 times more than peasant agriculture in its present state. Nevertheless, two factors should be taken into account: first, this kind of production is leading to ecological destruction. It eliminates forests, and contaminates the soil and the waters of oceans and rivers through the massive use of chemical products. Over the next 50 to 75 years we shall be creating the deserts of tomorrow. Second, peasants are being thrown off their lands, and millions of them have to migrate to the cities, to live in shanty towns, exacerbating the tasks of women and causing urban crises, as well as increasing internal migratory pressure, as in Brazil; or they are going to other countries (Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Ecuador, Philippines, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Morocco, Algeria, West Africa).Together with public services, agriculture is now one of the new frontiers for capital (Samir Amin, 2004), especially in times when the profitability of productive industrial capital is relatively reduced and there is a considerable expansion of financial capital seeking new sources of profit. Recently we have witnessed an unprecedented phenomenon: the land grabbing by private and State capital, particularly in Africa, for the production of food and agrofuels. The South Korean corporation Daewoo obtained a concession of 1,200,000 hectares in Madagascar for a period of 99 years, which provoked a serious political crisis in that country and finally a revision of the contract. Countries like Libya and the Gulf Emirates are doing likewise in Mali and various other African countries. European and North American mining and agro-energy multinationals are securing the opportunity to exploit tens of millions of hectares for long periods, as Chinese State and private enterprises are also doing. There is very little concern in these initiatives for the ecological and social implications, which are considered as ‘externalities’, i.e. external to market calculations. And this is precisely the second aspect of capitalist logic, after the growth of the rate of profitability. It is not capital that is having to deal with the negative effects, but local societies and individuals. This has always been the strategy of capital, even in the countries of the centre, with no concern for the fate of the working classes, or for the peoples in the peripheries under colonialism. There is no concern, either, for nature and the way of life of local populations. It is for all these reasons that the food crisis, in both its conjunctural and structural aspects, is directly linked to the logic of capitalism.

### Mexico

#### The 1AC’s calculative enframing of biofuels reduces the world to a standing reserve

-concealing its inner nature as an inexhaustible source of emergence.

-purifies complexities of biofuels

-calculative linearity

-calculative enframing to gain a tighter control over the world

-holy fuck this card is good

-note: iLUC=indirect land use change impacts of biofuels

Joronen and Humalsito 13 (Mikko Joronen-University of Turku, Department of Geography and Geology, Section Geography, Vesilinnantie 4, 20014 Turku, Finland, Niko Heikki Humalisto=Corresponding Author; “Looking beyond calculative spaces of biofuels: Onto-topologiesof indirect land use changes”; lord Faulkner)

3. Ontological politics of calculation and iLUC In order to exemplify assumptions behind the iLUC models, and thus the conditions of knowledge they generated for policy makers, we will now turn to discuss some of the key features of iLUC modelling. We will start with two key conditions behind the onto-topological inadequacies of iLUC models – the calculative linearity (from selected political and economic scenarios to the certain GHG emission values) and the reduced sense of agency in iLUC estimations – and further argue that these inadequacies are based on the two ontological conditions: on the denial of the inexhaustible possibility behind the self-emerging materiality of the real (which we refer to as the ‘earth’), and on the oblivion of the multiplicity of spatial assemblages between things and actors (whose combination we call the ’topology’). As will be explained in the last two parts of the paper, in order to properly grasp these ‘onto-topol-ogies’ of indirect land use changes, acknowledgement of the multiple geographical forms and active modes of self-presencing earth is required. The Commission’s iLUC consultation was accompanied with different partial and general agro-economic equilibrium models that quantified the iLUC impact of biofuel development in the terms of GHG emission values. The basic principles of studying iLUC through economic modelling were set by Searchinger et al. (2008) in their research concerning the indirect impacts of the corn ethanol in the US, even though later on the research has been argued to contain various weaknesses, the original estimates of iLUC, in particular, being too high (see Hertel et al., 2010: 223–224 for instance). Firstly, these models presuppose that iLUC is a marketmediated impact: the models begin by creating a baseline scenario for political and agricultural development, which is then shocked by a change in biofuel policy or the consumption of biofuels (see Edwards et al., 2010: 15). In order to measure such shocks, particularly the size and location of the iLUC, the models use quantitative parameters, such as price elasticity, the utilization of side-products, and yield responses. The devil, however, is in the detail. Not all of the parameters used in the models are empirically validated (see Birur et al., 2008; Laborde, 2011: 15), and consequently researchers have applied different values, which has caused considerable variations to the results (see Di Lucia et al., 2012). The produced estimations concerning the size and location of the iLUC are finally studied in relation with biophysical databases, such as the Agro-ecological Zones, in order to quantify GHG emissions related to land use changes (Birur et al., 2008: 14). Therefore, it is important to stress that the models provide knowledge concerning iLUC only under postulated scenarios instead of scrutinizing how iLUC is actually occurring – or how it could be in each case best counteracted. Secondly, iLUC models have challenges related to their dependency on historical land use patterns (IPCC, 2011: chapter 3), their postulation of linear relationships between factors that are known to be non-linear (Edwards et al., 2010: 27–28), and for their lack of sufficient and precise results caused by the growing multiplicity of geographical variances (Fast et al., 2012). Depending on the type of agro-economic model, modelling also loses institutional and spatial detail or treats changes in other sectors than agriculture externally (Prins et al., 2010: 5). The latter problem was satirically noted during the iLUC consultation by the Seed Processors and Oil Crushers Association: ‘‘It is something of a paradox to justify legislating on the issue of iLUC on the basis of studies that generally assume that legislation has little or no impact on land-use and the subsequent greenhouse gas emissions’’ (SPOCA, 2010). This argument illustrates an inherit weakness of the models to recognize the possibilities of counteracting iLUC, as they are not sensitive to new initiatives of land use planning or policies such as the strengthening of the areas of forest protection. Subsequently, the horizon of possible policy instruments for the mitigation of the iLUC became substantially narrowed. Although debates on finding the most suitable model for the assessment of iLUC impacts (Bauen et al., 2010; Overmars et al., 2011), and the best method for their empirical verification (see Andrade de Sa et al., 2013; Dale and Kim, 2011), are likely to continue, we suggest that the sustainability problem with indirect land use changes is not so much the appropriate selection or inaccuracy of the models as it is the ontological framing, which the models constitute by purifying the complexity of iLUC through the quantifiable realm of existence. Such purification, which we, by following the work of Martin Heidegger, refer to as the ‘enframing’ (das Gestell), denotes a specific mode of revealing that constitutes the phenomenological politics of iLUC impacts at the level of ontology (Heidegger, 1977, 2001b; see also Latour, 1993). By this, we want to acknowledge the ontological scaffolding the Commission adopted when defining the impacts and sustainability of biofuel production, without proper acknowledgement of the topological and relational nature of indirect land use changes. Accordingly, with ‘topology’ we refer to the heterogeneous placebased assemblages of biofuel production, the relational aspect emphasizing the constitution of these assemblages out of the multiple connections between human and non-human things – something that contemporary iLUC models cannot take into account. As Hertel et al. (2010: 230) pinpoint, there is a strong need to open up the iLUC question for the scientific traditions, which do not solely depend on the insights of economic calculations and deterministic models. As mentioned above, problems related to this approach of the European Commission are not primarily concerned with the appropriate (or inappropriate) use of the models but the calculative ‘enframing’ adopted with the use of the models as a basis for political decision making. The models, we argue, create a peculiar ontological relation to things: they reduce the emergence of things solely to controllable, measurable and available stock extracted from the unpredictable eventuality and topological heterogeneity of life itself. Accordingly, biofuel related entities, particularly carbon, but also changes related to biodiversity and water, are ripped away from their own modes of vital emergence and fields of complex relations, thus being forced into reserves accessible for the exhaustive calculations. Heidegger calls such accessible stock, in which things are enframed and made amenable to the power to calculate, measure, and order them with maximum predictable certainty, as ‘standing-reserve’ (Bestand) (Heidegger, 1977; see Demeritt, 2001; Joronen, 2008). As standing-reserves, things are not mere objects taken under full control; rather, their existence, their ontological mode of coming-to-presence, is enframed and reduced in advance to the reserve set available for the orders of modelling calculations. It is crucial to take into account that as a modality of revealing things, ‘enframing’ (Gestell) is not based on a success (or failure) of the used models, but on a peculiar ontological way of coming to presence. Enframing aims to purify the ‘presencing’ of things, their ontological multiplicity, in advance by reducing their presence into a set-up available for calculative manoeuvring and possession. This calculative ordering-revealing of things does not signify a full capture of things and their relations through the models – the logic of calculative enframing is only structured to function this way. Accordingly, ‘enframing’ denotes a measurement of revealing, the way things come to presence, not as an achievement of the complete ordering of things but as a drive to do so. The ‘enframing’ is not only ordering-revealing, but also a challenging-revealing – a revealing that challenges things in order to predict and measure their movements with best possible certainty. Although it is important to stress that the results of iLUC models are not random – the accountability of the models can also be questioned through empirical research, as Wicke et al. (2012: 91) argue – this mission itself is precisely the innermost limit of modelling. Instead of acknowledging the unpredictable and random events of revealing, the models are structured to gain tighter control and ordering of things with the variables that do not concern the messiness and uncontrollability of the becoming of actual relations, but their explanation, prediction and mastering through calculative and abstract approximations. Such calculative challenging – a drive towards a greater improvement of ordering – is always measured with regard to its own success: it neglects those local and particular anomalies that escape the grip of its enframing, at its best dealing them as not-yet-ordered circumstances in need of more efficient computing. Fundamentally ‘enframing’, and its calculative operations, do not refer to numbers and counting, but to the quality of revealing, which unfolds things by manipulating them into a setting where they can be ordered, controlled and challenged with calculative plans, scenarios and models. In the Gestell things are not only undifferentiated in ontological terms but also spatially. As ‘enframed’ things are moved apart from their originary sites of revealing, dis-placed into spatially indifferent and universally measurable relations, eventually being turned into mere nodes and variables subordinate to the distanceless nexuses of calculative ordering (Joronen, 2012, see also Elden, 2006). Accordingly, the iLUC impact is solely measured with regard to the calculative schemes set beforehand, such ‘enframing’ reducing the complex and unpredictably invasive land use changes into universal, topologically uncomprehending ontological frameworks. In order to secure the ecological sustainability of biofuel feedstock, the abstractions of the calculative models are structured to force the impacts of biofuel production from their surroundings and connections to the realm of calculative handling. All in all, Gestell is able to ‘enframe’ things into ‘standing-reserves’ by veiling two elements intrinsic to the emergence of biofuel production: the actual multiplicity of topological connections between things and human actors and the inexhaustible possibility behind the unpredictable self-emerge of material entities. In what follows, we will further concentrate on these two elements; firstly, on the denial of the self-emerging materiality, which we refer to, after Heidegger, as the ‘earth’, and secondly, on the obliteration of the complex geographies of the actualized topological relations. While the notion of earth refers to the ontological nature of iLUC calculations as a something which frame the potentiality for the unpredictable emergence of things, the latter refers to a lack of understanding concerning the actual topological outcomes these iLUC models pose. Since we will start by discussing how the calculative rationale of the models operates by enframing the potential emergence of biofuel related entities, we need to focus for a minute on the general question concerning the inner logic of Gestell, and further, on how it leads to the dismissal not only of the active occurrence of material entities, but of the topological nature of the actual biofuel assemblages. After all, it is by enframing the potentiality that the models end up in oblivion of actuality. First of all, it is crucial to notice that Heidegger does not define the earth through the paradigms of modern mathematical physics or natural sciences but in terms of concealment. By concealment he refers to the central feature constitutive for the materiality of the earth: the earth always flees the effort to fully capture and measure it, thus concealing its inner nature as an inexhaustible source of emergence. What thus remains concealed, escaping the power of calculative mastering, is the vital materiality of the earth, its own active and unpredictable emergence (Heidegger, 2001a; Joronen, 2012; Rose, 2012). Calculative attempts to model iLUC impacts cannot capture such active and unpredictable process of emergence: the earth flees all efforts of complete representation and measurement, leading eventually to the manifold and unpredictable gatherings of entities. Unexpected ruptures in the functioning of forest ecosystems affected by plantations, or sudden changes in global agricultural trade due to climatic disruptions, are examples par excellence of the potential events that are concealed from iLUC models, but which nevertheless, could have tremendous influence on the way iLUC actualize. It is due to its inner drive to order and measure that the calculative modelling cannot capture what remains concealed, and escapes all acts of measurements: the earth, which the production of biofuel feedstock is fundamentally grounded on. The calculative ‘enframing’ of biofuel assemblages is simply stuck with what Heidegger calls the ‘strife’ between the revealing (which our way of being-in-the-world brings forth) and the concealment (which the earth, in turn, signifies) (see Heidegger, 2001b). With the notion of ‘strife’, we want to bring forth a central feature constitutive for the phenomenological politics behind the calculative enframing of biofuel assemblages: the ontological play of concealing-revealing. We understand biofuel assemblages, as they are constituted through the interactive relation between the revealing and the concealment, between particular ways of world-revealing and the sites of concealing earth these ways aim to reveal. In other words, while different modalities of being-inthe- world aim to define the materiality of the earth through the particular measurements of revealing they denote, at the same time the earth comes forth by disturbing the revealing through the matrix of vital becoming and self-emergence it, in turn, denotes. The strife thus creates an ambiguous relation. On the one hand, it is the earth that makes possible the revealing of things (i.e. it is the materiality of things that is given for worldly measures to disclose). On the other hand, it is also peculiar to the earth that it resists the revealing by withdrawing back into itself (i.e. the earth is never exhausted into particular worldly revealing, but instead conceals its inner depth, its inexhaustibility in revealing) (Heidegger, 2001b: 33–34). The ontological politics of ‘enframing’ (Gestell) operates precisely through this ontological play between the revealing and concealment – not just through it, but also by totally hiding it. Enframing turns the revealing of the world into ordering revealing, converting the world into a ‘world-picture’, so squeezing the concealment out of the earth through the relations of calculability in which it submits the earth. Calculative enframing of biofuel assemblages simply does not allow the earth to conceal itself: it brings things into being by emptying their presence into availability in orderable and measurable frameworks of calculation, thus concealing the fact that the earth conceals itself through its escape of all grounding definitions. Calculating models, thus, do reveal things – after all, they are a mode of ordering-revealing – but at the same time they conceal the whole question of concealing-revealing through their intrinsic endeavour to order, measure and manipulate things. In other words, the calculative enframing of iLUC impacts sets up in advance the scaffolding of the world, that is, what the world consists of, and thus rips off things from their original topologies and vitalities of material emergence. As Anderson and Wylie (2009: 328) summarize, without acknowledging that initial conditions in an assemblage ‘‘condition but do not determine what emerges’’, there remains a danger of what Serres (1982) calls the ‘retrospective illusion’ of proceeding from the conditions to the products and not the other way around. This brings forth the second element constitutive for the Commission’s measurement of the iLUC impacts of biofuels: the obliteration of the complex geographies of topological relatedness, which we will next turn into.

#### Economic engagement is an imperialist tool used to forward US geopolitical dominance – perpetuates North/South warfare

Jones, 4(Martin Jones\* - PhD in Human Geography from the University of Manchester, Rhys Jones; Professor of Human Geography at the University

of Wales Aberystwyth\*\* - Professor in Human Geography @ the University¶ of Wales Aberystwyth, Michael Woods\*\*\* - PhD in Human Geography from Bristol University; Professor of Human Geography and Director of the Institute of Geography and Earth Sciences @ the University¶ of Wales Aberystwyth, 2004, “AN INTRODUCTION TO POLITICAL GEOGRAPHY Space, place and politics”, http://118.97.161.124/perpus-fkip/Perpustakaan/Geography/Geografi%20manusia/Pengantar%20Geografi%20Politik.pdf) MD

Political domination can take on many forms. At¶ its most basic and uncompromising, it is based on¶ military relationships between two or more parties.¶ Much of the rationale behind the proliferation of¶ nuclear weapons during the Cold War, for instance,¶ was based upon the West and the East’s need to secure¶ strategic military and, therefore, political advantage¶ over their enemies. This became the main justiﬁcation¶ for the global political and military face-off between¶ East and West that characterised the international¶ relations of the Cold War. A more recent example has been the nuclear stand-off between India and Pakistan¶ over the disputed province of Kashmir (Dodds 2000:¶ 103–6). Once again, overt displays of the military¶ might of the two countries have been used as a means¶ of securing strategic, military and political advantage¶ within the region. Political forms of geopolitical¶ domination can also occur in more subtle and hidden¶ ways. A good instance of this is the persistent military¶ inﬂuence of the United States in neighbouring countries in the Caribbean, Central and South America ¶ (see Dodds 2000: 57). The most infamous examples ¶ of these more covert efforts by the United States to¶ influence the internal politics of other independent¶ states have been in Guatemala, Nicaragua and Cuba.¶ These latter examples also begin to demonstrate the¶ strong connections between political and economic¶ aspects of geopolitical strategy, where political interference is accompanied by various forms of financial¶ aid. A key method of securing geopolitical inﬂuence¶ and dominance in recent years has been the ﬁnancial¶ and technological aid offered by dominant countries to¶ other, needy countries. In many ways, if military might represents the ‘stick’ of international relations, then¶ ﬁnancial aid is the ‘carrot’. Numerous examples exist¶ to demonstrate the role of economic influence in¶ shaping international geopolitical relations. In the¶ period after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in 1990, for¶ instance, there was much debate in the international¶ community concerning the best way to secure the¶ freedom of the latter. Much of the political shenanigans¶ of the period took place in the corridors of the United¶ Nations in New York. The famous journalist John¶ Pilger (1992) has noted how the United States tried¶ to use its economic muscle as a way of securing the¶ support of other states for its plan to mount an invasion¶ of Kuwait and Iraq. In this respect, its main efforts were¶ directed towards the non-permanent members of the¶ Security Council of the United Nations, which, at that¶ time, included one of the poorest states in the world,¶ Yemen. It is a little-known fact that Yemen voted not¶ to support an invasion of the Middle East by American led UN forces. In the immediate aftermath of the vote,¶ it is alleged by Pilger (1992), the Yemeni ambassador¶ to the United Nations was informed by his US counterpart that that was the most costly decision he¶ had ever made. In the following weeks, $70 million of¶ proposed US aid to Yemen was cancelled, the World¶ Bank and the International Monetary Fund began to¶ question the economic practices of the Yemeni state¶ and 800,000 Yemeni workers were expelled from Saudi¶ Arabia. As Dodds (2000) has argued, occurrences such as¶ these are part of a broader range of economic strategies¶ that help certain Northern states to achieve geopolitical¶ dominance over Southern countries. The influence ¶ of industrialised countries over institutions such as ¶ the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund and ¶ the World Trade Organisation has been particularly¶ important. It has helped to generate an additional ¶ layer of compliance within international relations. The¶ best example of this process is the so-called ‘structural¶ adjustment programmes’ of the World Bank, which¶ seek to constrain the range of economic and political¶ policies that can be pursued by less industrialised¶ countries (Dodds 2000: 17; see also Krasner 2001:¶ 28–9). The criticism levelled at these programmes is¶ that they reify a particularly industrialised model of¶ development on southern states and, as such, represent¶ **a new form of informal imperialism by northern states.¶** In many ways, these examples illustrate the strong¶ connections between geopolitics and the broader international political economy (see Agnew and Corbridge¶ 1995).¶

#### That causes imperialistic violence versus the Latin “other” – root cause of 1AC conflict claims, promotes militaristic ethics, and legitimizes faulty, hegemonic knowledge-production

Grandin 6 (Empire's Workshop: Latin America, the United States, and the Rise of the New Imperialism, Greg Grandin, Macmillan, May 2, 2006 –BRW)

The ARGENTINE WRITER Jorge Luis Borges once remarked that the lack of camels in the Koran proves its Middle Eastern provenance: only a native author, he explained, could have so taken the animal for granted as not to mention it. Perhaps a similar familiarity explains the absence of Latin America in recent discussions about the United States and its empire. Though Latin America has played an indispensable role in the rise of the United States to global power, it elicits little curiosity from its neighbor to the north. "Latin America doesn't matter,” Richard Nixon advised a young Donald Rumsfeld, who was casting about for career opportunities. “Long as we’ve been in it, people don’t give one damn about Latin America.”' Likewise today. In their search for historical precedents for our current imperial moment, intellectuals invoke postwar reconstructions of Germany and japan, ancient Rome and nineteenth-century Britain but consistently ignore the one place where the United States has projected its influence for more than two centuries. "People don’t give one shit" about the place, Nixon said.: Vi/ere it not for Borges’s insight, this studied indifference to Latin America would seem ironic, for the region has long served as a workshop of empire, the place where the United States elaborated tactics of extraterritorial administration and acquired its conception of itself as an empire like no other before it. The Western hemisphere was to be the staging ground for a new “empire for liberty," a phrase used by Thomas Jefferson specifically in reference to Spanish Florida and Cuba. Unlike European empires, ours was supposed to entail a concert of equal, sovereign democratic American republics, with shared interests and values, led but not dominated by the United States—a conception of empire that remains Washington’s guiding vision. The same direction of influence is evident in any number of examples. The United States’s engagement with the developing world after World War II, for instance, is often viewed as an extension of its postwar policies in Europe and japan, yet that view has it exactly backwards. Washington’s first attempts, in fact, to restructure another country’s economy took place in the developing world—in Mexico in the years after the American Civil War and in Cuba following the Spanish-American War. “We should do for Europe on a large seale,” remarked the U.S. ambassador to England in 1914, "essentially what we did for Cuba on a small scale and thereby usher in a new era of human history.” Likewise, most discussions of George W. Bush’s foreign policy focus on the supposed innovation of a small group of neoconservative intellectuals in asserting the right to unilateral preemptive military action both to defend national security and to advance American ideals. But neither the neocons’ dire view of a crisis-ridden world that justifies the use of unilateral and brutal American military power nor their utopian vision of the same world made whole and happy by that power is new. Both have been fully in operation in Washington’s approach to Latin America for over a century. The history of the United States in Latin America is cluttered with “preemptive" interventions that even the most stalwart champions of U.S. hegemony have trouble defending. From the mid-nineteenth to the early twentieth century, the U.S. military sharpened its lighting skills and developed its modernday organizational structure largely in constant conflict with Latin America—in its drive west when it occupied Mexico in the midnineteenth century aml took more than half of that country’s national territory. And in its push south: by 1930, Washington had sent gunboats into Latin American ports over six thousand times, invaded Cuba, Mexico (again), Guatemala, and Honduras, fought protracted guerrilla wars in the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua, and Haiti, annexed Puerto Rico, and taken a piece of Colombia to create both the Panamanian nation and the Panama Canal. For their part, American corporations and financial houses came to dominate the economies of Mexico, the Caribbean, and Central America, as well as large parts of South America, apprenticing themselves in overseas expansion before they headed elsewhere, to Asia, Africa, and Europe. Yet Latin America did more than serve as a staging ground for the United States’s early push toward empire. The region provided a school where foreign policy officials and intellectuals could learn to apply what political scientists like to call “soft power”—that is, the spread of America’s authority through nonnilitary means, through commerce, cultural exchange, and multilateral cooperation} At first, the United States proved a reluctant student. It took decades of mounting Latin American anti-imperialist resistance, including armed resistance, to force Washington to abandon its militarism. But abandon it it finally did, at least for a short time. In the early 1930s, Franklin D. Roosevelt promised that henceforth the United States would be a "good neighbor," that it would recognize the absolute sovereignty of individual nations, renounce its right to engage in unilateral interventions, and make concessions to economic nationalists. Rather than weaken U.S. influence in the Western Hemisphere, this newfound moderation in fact institutionalized Washington’s authority, drawing Latin .American republics tighter into its political, economic, and cultural orbit through a series of multilateral treaties and regional organizations. The Good Neighbor policy was the model for the European and Asian alliance system, providing a blueprint for America’s “empire by invitation,” as one historian famously described Washington’s rise to unprecedented heights of world power} But even as Washington was working out the contours of its kinder, gentler empire in postwar Western Europe and japan, back in the birthplace of American soft power it was rearming. **Latin America has once again became a school where the United States studied how to execute imperial violence through proxies.** After World War II, in the name of containing Communism, the United States, mostly through the actions of local allies, executed or encouraged coups in, among other places, Guatemala, Brazil, Chile, Uruguay, and Argentina and patronized a brutal mercenary war in Nicaragua. Latin America became a laboratory for counter insurgency, as military officials and covert operators applied insights learned in the re-gion to Southeast Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. By the end of the Cold War, Latin American security forces trained, funded, equipped, and incited by Washington had executed a reign of bloody terror—hundreds of thousands killed, an equal number tortured, millions driven into exile—from which the region has yet to fully recover. This reign of terror has had consequences more far-reaching than the damage done to Latin America itself, for it was this rehabilitation of hard power that directly influenced America°s latest episode of imperial overreach in the wake of 9/1 1. It is often noted in passing that a number of the current administration’s officials, advisers, and hangers-on are veterans of Ronald Reagan’s Central American policy in the 1980s, which included the patronage of anti-Communist governments in El Salvador and Guatemala and anti-Communist insurgents in Nicaragua. The list includes Elliott Abrams, Bush’s current deputy national security adviser in charge of promoting democracy throughout the world; john Negroponte, former U.N. ambassador, envoy to Iraq, and now intelligence czar; Otto Reich, secretary of state for the Western Hemisphere during Bush°s first term; and Robert Kagan, an ardent advocate of U.S. global hegemony. john Poindexter, convicted of lying to Congress, conspiracy, and destroying evidence in the IranContra scandal during his tenure as Reagan’s national security adviser, was appointed by Rumsfeld to oversee the Pentagon’s stillborn Total Information Awareness program. john Bolton, ambassador to the United Nations and an arch-unilateralist, served as Reagan’s point man in the justice Department to stonewall investigations into Iran-Contra.; Yet the links between the current Bush administrations revolution in foreign policy and Reagan’s hard line in Central America are even more profound than the simple recycling of personnel. It was Central America, and Latin America more broadly, where an insurgent New Right first coalesced, as conservative activists used the region to respond to the crisis of the 1970s, a crisis provoked not only by America’s defeat in Vietnam but by a deep economic recession and a culture of skeptical antimilitarism and political dissent that spread in the war’s wake. Indeed, Reagan’s Central American wars can best be understood as a dress rehearsal for what is going on now in the Middle East. It was in these wars where the coalition made up of neoconservatives, Christian evangelicals, free marketers, and nationalists that today stands behind George W. Bush’s expansive foreign policy first came together. There they had near free rein to bring the full power of the United States against a much weaker enemy in order to exorcise the ghost of Vietnam—and, in so doing, begin the transformation of America’s foreign policy and domestic culture. A critical element of that transformation entailed shifting the rationale of American diplomacy away from containment to rollback, from one primarily justified in terms of national defense to one charged with advancing what Bush likes to call a “global democratic revolution.” The domestic fight over how to respond to revolutionary nationalism in Central America allowed conservative ideologues to remoralize both American diplomacy and capitalism, to counteract the cynicism that had seeped into both popular culture and the political establishment regarding the deployment of U.S. power in the world. Thus they pushed the Republican Party away from its foreign policy pragmatism to the idealism that now defines the “war on terror” as a world crusade of free-market nation building. At the same time, the conflicts in Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Guatemala allowed New Right militarists to find ways to bypass the restrictions enacted by Congress and the courts in the wake of Vietnam that limited the executive branch’s ability to fight wars, conduct covert operations, and carry out domestic surveillance of political activists. The Reagan White House perfected new techniques to manipulate the media, Congress, and public opinion while at the same time re empowering domestic law enforcement agencies to monitor and harass political dissidents. These techniques, as we shall see, prefigured initiatives now found in the PR campaign to build support for the war in Iraq and in the Patriot Act, reinvigorating the national security state in ways that resonate to this day. The Central American wars also provided the New Christian Right its first extensive experience in foreign affairs, as the White House mobilized evangelical activists in order to neutralize domestic opponents of a belligerent foreign policy. It was here where New Right Christian theologians first joined with secular nationalists to elaborate an ethical justification for a rejuvenated militarism. In other words, it was in Central America where the Republican Party first combined the three elements that give today’s imperialism its moral force: punitive idealism, free-market absolutism, and right-wing Christian mobilization. The first justified a belligerent diplomacy not just for the sake of national security but to advance “freedom.” The second sanctified property rights and the unencumbered free market as the moral core of the freedom it was America’s duty to export. The third backed up these ideals with social power, as the Republican Party learned how to channel the passions of its evangelical base into the international arena. 'lb focus, therefore, exclusively on neoconservative intellectuals, as much of the commentary attempting to identify the origins of the new imperialism does, deflects attention away from the long history of American expansion. The intellectual architects of the Bush Doctrine are but part of a larger resurgence of nationalist militarism, serving as the ideologues of an American revanchism fired by a lethal combination of humiliation in Vietnam and vindication in the Cold War, of which Central America was the tragic endgame.

## 2NC

### 2NC AT: FW

**Focusing on policy-making first absolves individual contribution and cedes the political – ensures their impacts are inevitable and provides an independent reason to vote negative**

**Trennel 6** (Paul Trennel, Ph. D from the University of Wales, Department of International Politics; “The (Im)possibility of Environmental Security,” September 2006, http://cadair.aber.ac.uk/dspace/bitstream/handle/2160/410/trenellpaulipm0060.pdf?sequence=2)

Thirdly, it can be claimed that the security mindset channels the obligation to address environmental issues in an unwelcome direction. Due to terms laid out by the social contract “security is essentially something done by states…there is no obligation or moral duty on citizens to provide security…In this sense security is essentially empty…it is not a sign of positive political initiative” (Dalby, 1992a: 97-8). Therefore, casting an issue in security terms puts the onus of action onto governments, creating a docile citizenry who await instructions from their leaders as to the next step rather than taking it on their own backs to do something about pressing concerns. This is unwelcome because governments have limited incentives to act on environmental issues, as their collectively poor track record to date reveals. Paul Brown notes that “at present in all the large democracies the short-term politics of winning the next election and the need to increase the annual profits of industry rule over the long term interests of the human race” (1996: 10; see also Booth 1991: 348). There is no clearer evidence for this than the grounds on which George W. Bush explained his decision to opt out of the Kyoto Protocol: “I told the world I thought that Kyoto was a lousy deal for America…It meant that we had to cut emissions below 1990 levels, which would have meant I would have presided over massive layoffs and economic destruction” (BBC: 2006). The short-term focus of government elites and the long-term nature of the environmental threat means that any policy which puts the burden of responsibility on the shoulders of governments should be viewed with scepticism as this may have the effect of breeding inaction on environmental issues. Moreover, governmental legislation may not be the most appropriate route to solving the problem at hand. If environmental vulnerabilities are to be effectively addressed “[t]he routine behaviour of practically everyone must be altered” (Deudney, 1990: 465). In the case of the environmental sector it is not large scale and intentional assaults but the cumulative effect of small and seemingly innocent acts such as driving a car or taking a flight that do the damage. Exactly how a legislative response could serve to alter “non-criminal apolitical acts by individuals” (Prins, 1993: 176- 177) which lie beyond established categories of the political is unclear. Andrew Dobson has covered this ground in claiming that the solution to environmental hazards lies not in piecemeal legislation but in the fostering of a culture of “ecological citizenship”. His call is made on the grounds that legislating on the environment, forcing people to adapt, does not reach the necessary depth to produce long-lasting change, but merely plugs the problem temporarily. He cites Italian “car-free city” days as evidence of this, noting that whilst selected cities may be free of automobiles on a single predetermined day, numbers return to previous levels immediately thereafter (2003: 3). This indicates that the deeper message underlying the policy is not being successfully conveyed. Enduring environmental solutions are likely to emerge only when citizens choose to change their ways because they understand that there exists a pressing need to do so. Such a realisation is unlikely to be prompted by the top-down, state oriented focus supplied by a security framework.

Affirmative cannot win that they have any practical effects

Schlag 90 (Pierre, Stanford LR, November, Lexis)

In fact, normative legal thought is so much in a hurry that it will tell you what to do even though there is not the slightest chance that you might actually be in a position to do it. For instance, when was the last time you were in a position to put the difference principle n31 into effect, or to restructure [\*179] the doctrinal corpus of the first amendment? "In the future, we should. . . ." When was the last time you were in a position to rule whether judges should become pragmatists, efficiency purveyors, civic republicans, or Hercules surrogates? Normative legal thought doesn't seem overly concerned with such worldly questions about the character and the effectiveness of its own discourse. It just goes along and proposes, recommends, prescribes, solves, and resolves. Yet despite its obvious desire to have worldly effects, worldly consequences, normative legal thought remains seemingly unconcerned that for all practical purposes, its only consumers are legal academics and perhaps a few law students -- persons who are virtually never in a position to put any of its wonderful normative advice into effect.

Externalizing ethics onto legal institutions trades off with personal ethics

Rozo 4 (Diego, MA in philosophy and Cultural Analysis @ U of Amsterdam, Forgiving the Unforgivable: On Violence, Power, and the Possibility of Justice, p. 19-21, http://www.banrepcultural.org/blaavirtual/tesis/colfuturo/Forgiving%20the%20Unforgivable.pdf)//LA \*\*\*We don’t endorse gendered language.

Within the legal order the relations between individuals will resemble this logic where suffering is exchanged for more, but ‘legal’ suffering, because these relations are no longer regulated by the “culture of the heart” [Kultur des Herzens]. (CV 245) As Benjamin describes it, the “legal system tries to erect, in all areas where individual ends could be usefully pursued by violence, legal ends that can be realized only by legal power.” (CV 238) The individual is not to take law in his own hands; no conflict should be susceptible of being solved without the direct intervention of law, lest its authority will be undermined. Law has to present itself as indispensable for any kind of conflict to be solved. The consequence of this infiltration of law throughout the whole of human life is paradoxical: the more inescapable the rule of law is, the less responsible the individual becomes. Legal and judicial institutions act as avengers in the name of the individual. Even the possibility of forgiveness is monopolized by the state under the ‘right of mercy’. Hence the responsibility of the person toward the others is now delegated on the authority and justness of the law. The legal institutions, the very agents of (legal) vengeance exonerate me from my essential responsibility towards the others, breaking the moral proximity that makes every ethics possible.20 Thus I am no longer obliged to an other that by his/her very presence would demand me to be worthy of the occasion (of every occasion), because law, by seeking to regulate affairs between individuals, makes this other anonymous, virtual: his otherness is equaled to that of every possible other. The Other becomes faceless, making it all too easy for me to ignore his demands of justice, and even to exert on him violence just for the sake of legality. The logic of evil, then, becomes not a means but an end in itself:21 state violence for the sake of the state’s survival. Hence, the ever-present possibility of the worst takes the form of my unconditional responsibility towards the other being delegated on the ideological and totalitarian institutions of a law gone astray in the (its) logic of self- preserving vengeance. The undecidability of the origin of law, and its consequent meddling all across human affairs makes it possible that the worst could be exerted in the name of law. Even the very notion of crimes against humanity, which seeks to protect the life of the population, can be overlooked by the state if it feels threatened by other states or by its own population.22 From now on, my responsibility towards the Other is taken from me, at the price of my own existence being constantly threatened by the imminent and fatal possibility of being signaled as guilty of an (for me) indeterminate offence. In this picture, the modern state protects my existence while bringing on the terror of state violence – the law infiltrates into and seeks to rule our most private conflicts.

### 2NC AT: Perm

**The permutation still links—it includes the plan and its attendant macropolitical focus—both of which are direct links to our argument per the 1NC Bobertz evidence and this new card:**

Princen, Maniates and Conca(Thomas Princen, Michael Maniates, and Ken Conca, July 2002, Confronting Consumption)

How might ordinary people living in high-consumption societies begin to clarify and act on these unsettling intuitions? Where can they turn for insight, systematic analysis, support, intervention strategies, or hope of effective action? Certainly not to the policymaking arena. There one finds processes of thought and decision dominated, perhaps as never before, by two forces: a deeply seated economistic reasoning and a politics of growth that cuts across the political spectrum. According to prevailing economistic thought, consumption is nothing less than the Purpose of the economy. Economic activity is separated into supply and demand, and demand-that is, consumer purchasing behavior-is relegated to the black box of consumer sovereignty. The demand function is an aggregation of individual preferences each set of which is unknowable and can only be expressed in revealed form through market purchases. Thus analytic and policy attention is directed to production-that is, to the processes of supplying consumers with what they desire.

### At: no extinction

**Framing the environment in terms of the economy makes collapse inevitable – terminal uniqueness**

**Weiskel 97** (Timothy - Research Director @ the Cambridge Climate Research Associates – PhD in Anthropology from Oxford, “Selling Pigeons in the Temple:

The Danger of Market Metaphors in an Ecosystem”, Harvard Seminar on Environmental Values, <http://www.ecoethics.net/OPS-008.HTM>) //MD

The natural order of the world and our role within it is affirmed by market enthusiasts and politicians alike to be an inevitable manifestation of the ongoing logic of an economy of unending, capitalist accumulation. In recent electoral history, politicians took pride in mouthing the simple syllogism, "it's the economy, stupid!" -- as if the only significant role of political leadership was to "grow the economy." Whether we like it or not -- whether we fully know it or not -- this entire worldview is subconsciously enlisted whenever we surrender to the use of market metaphors in devising public policy. It is no wonder that in this framework it is impossible to formulate effective environmental policy to protect biodiversity. Such a worldview arbitrarily restricts the notion of what is possible to what is profitable. Market metaphors truncate the range of policy options open to environmental leaders, and the vocabulary and images these metaphors generate completely fail to capture what we humans value most about our rich and complex world of everyday human experience. The insidious thought control exercised by market metaphors in the public discourse needs to be squarely confronted and firmly rejected. Only by stepping outside the make-believe world of these market metaphors is it possible to see why they mystify rather than clarify our environmental circumstance. Essentially, market metaphors are based on a logical fallacy that projects a fundamental falsification of reality. Despite frequent appeals to the "real world," market advocates live in a self-contained world of abstract modeling, statistical fantasies and paper currency that serves as a proxy measure of wealth. In fact, the real world is quite a different place, consisting of the physical parameters of all life forms that can be measured in terms of meters from sea-level, metric tons of gas emissions and degrees of temperature variation. The human economy needs to be understood as a subset of this physical ecosystem and not the other way around. Environmental policy based on an inverted representation of reality cannot help but fail in the long run. It is for this reason that economism -- the belief that principles of market economics can and should always be used to resolve environmental public policy dilemmas -- represents such a palpable failure of political leadership. Further, the attempt to substitute economism for meaningful public policy constitutes a blatant abdication of the public trust. This tragic abdication of the public trust through the relentless pursuit of economism has fueled the current righteous indignation of global citizens sensitive to the environment and concerned about the prospect of human survival. Politicians under the spell of economism fail to grasp what growing numbers of decent citizens sense and seek to affirm from a very deep level of conviction, and that is simply this: biodiversity must be saved for its intrinsic, expressive, and relational value -- not simply for the momentary advantage it may yield in some economist's cost-benefit calculations. If global policy makers do not free themselves from the trap of market mantras, their claim to leadership will be seen to be vacuous and illegitimate in the long run. This will be so because misplaced market metaphors cannot help but prove fatal in mediating human relationships with the environment. Taken together they have the power to drive industrial civilization into the sad syndrome of "overshoot-and-collapse" so often characteristic of failed economies of accumulation throughout human history. Unless radically different forms of valuation can be rediscovered, unless public leaders can learn to embrace and articulate them, and unless these leaders can then proceed to formulate effective public policy based on these new values to change collective human behavior, we will witness the demise of industrial society as the unavoidable outcome of "business as usual."

In short, public leadership needs now to define, declare and defend the public good in terms that transcend private self-interest. There are no doubt connections between the public good and private gain, but to justify the former exclusively in terms of the latter is a fundamental mistake of moral reasoning. Without political leadership that can understand this fundamental difference and learn to defend the public good in its own right, industrial civilization will become irretrievably consumed in a scramble for private profit and personal advantage in a dismal world of diminishing resources. The Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, expressed this fear with a rivetting sense of urgency in his opening remarks at the Earth Summit Plus Five conference in New York.(6) Failure to act now could damage our planet irreversibly, unleashing a spiral of increased hunger, deprivation, disease and squalor. Ultimately, we could face the destabilising effects of conflict over vital natural resources....We must not fail. In past epochs individual religious and spiritual figures emerged to warn society of this kind of impending doom. Prophets of old inveighed against gluttonous consumption based on inequity and iniquity, and they warned societies of the physical consequences of failing to mend their ways. Perhaps more importantly, they served to remind societies of the natural order of the created world and the proper place for humankind within it. Amos, Jesus of Nazareth and Mohammed of Medina all arose in the ancient near east with strikingly parallel messages in this regard. Jews, Christians and Muslims to this day retain scriptural traditions which remind them that the earth does not ultimately belong to humans, nor will their mistreatment of the earth or their fellow creatures go unpunished. In these religious traditions arrogant, self-centered behavior with regard to the created order is thought to be morally wrong, however expedient or profitable it may prove to be for individuals in the short run. We are not fully informed by the preserved text, but one suspects that selling pigeons in the temple prompted a sense of moral indignation on the part of Jesus of Nazareth, not because the prices were a bit too high. Rather such activity inspired moral outrage because selling pigeons in the temple involved a fundamental confusion of the market place with sacred space. It is -- perhaps not surprisingly -- the scientists who speak with the prophetic voice of conviction in our day. Physicists like Nobel Laureate Henry Kendall, the late astronomer Carl Sagan, the evolutionary biologist Edward Wilson and renowned "public" scientists like the late oceanographer Jacques Cousteau now provide us with the clarion call to awareness and action that parallels the prophetic message of old. In a document entitled World Scientists' Warning to Humanity the Union of Concerned Scientists representing more than one hundred Nobel laureates put the message quite plainly:(7) Human beings and the natural world are on a collision course. Human activities inflict harsh and often irreversible damage on the environment and on critical resources. If not checked, many of our current practices put at serious risk the future that we wish for human society and the plant and animal kingdoms, and may so alter the living world that it will be unable to sustain life in the manner that we know. Fundamental changes are urgent if we are to avoid the collision our present course will bring about. It is hard to image a more thorough embodiment of the ancient prophetic tradition. Nevertheless, economists and politicians -- the scribes and Pharisees of our day -- do not yet seem to have understood the point. It is not that their prices are inaccurate -- goodness knows we have some of the world's most clever economists and accountants devoted to the task of assigning nature its cash value. We cannot expect much better on this score. But the issue before us is more fundamental than this. The essential problem is that to approach the issue of biodiversity as if it were an exercise in global bean-counting is fundamentally wrongheaded. It is wrong because it mistakes price for value, proffering market valuations as a proxy surrogate for a meaningful discussion of values. In such a constricted framework there can never be a purposeful debate -- only a mindless, mechanical and endless set of calculations. Given the two-year time frame of the electoral cycle and the pressures to craft policy to please rich and influential interest groups, there are powerful and evident reasons why politicians may well wish to avoid meaningful discussions about values and the environment. In this sense, the alliance between economists and politicians is a marriage of considerable convenience for both partners, but it must be made clear to each of them that this is not acceptable as a mode of public leadership. On this point, scientists and spiritual leaders agree, and it is for this reason that they have joined forces in such impressive numbers to express themselves in terms of the moral obligations facing the human community. The Union of Concerned Scientists has joined with the National Religious Partnership for the Environment to reiterate the prophetic message in churches, temples and mosques across the country and around the world. In a similar vein, research scientists at Harvard have provided strong support for the activities of the Harvard Seminar on Environmental Values convened by the University's Committee on Environment and the Center for the Study of Values in Public Life in order specifically to explore the full range of valuation -- not just economic costs -- which can be drawn upon in developing public policy to protect the environment and biodiversity. The message from spiritual leaders and research scientists alike is as clear as it is forceful: we did not create the world; we cannot control it; we must not destroy it. More precisely: we must not commodify and merchandise biodiversity merely because in the short run it may appear profitable for us to do so. Convinced that we know the price of everything we will soon have lost the ability to value anything that is priceless. The capacity to value some things and human experiences beyond all measure of worldly worth and to esteem them without any thought of their exchange value or sale is surely one of the most cherished attributes that makes us human. To forget this or deny it is to disavow our humanity, and **down that road lies our swift and certain extinction.** The capacity to appreciate intrinsic value is not a quality of humanity that it would be wise to denigrate, dismiss or eliminate in formulating environmental public policy. On the contrary, it may well constitute our last, best hope for survival as a species.

**Economic collapse is inevitable due to limits to growth – tech can't solve fast enough**

DENNIS **MEADOWS** Emeritus Professor of Systems Management, and former director of the Institute for Policy and Social Science Research at the University of New Hampshire http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/limits-to-growth-author-dennis-meadows-says-that-crisis-is-approaching-a-871570.html 12-7**-12**

SPIEGEL ONLINE: Several central forecasts you made in the book have come true, the exponential growth of the world's population, for example, and widespread environmental destruction. Your prediction regarding economic growth, namely that it would ultimately cease and the global economy would collapse, has not yet come to pass. Meadows: The fact that the collapse hasn't occurred so far doesn't mean it won't take place in the future. There is no doubt that the world is changing, and we will have to go along with it. There are two ways to do that: One is, you see the necessity of change ahead of time and you make the change, and the second is that you don't and are finally forced to do it anyway. Let's say that you're driving a car inside a factory building. There are two ways to stop: Either you put on the brakes or you keep going and hit the wall. But stop you will, because the building is finite. And the same holds true for Earth's resources. SPIEGEL ONLINE: That sounds convincing, but is it really true? Will not private companies react to dwindling resources with innovation in an effort to maintain profitability? Meadows: The really big changes don't come from inside of established industries. Who made the iPhone? Not Nokia, not Motorola, nor any of the other established mobile phone producers. It came from Apple, totally outside the industry. There are many other examples of this kind. SPIEGEL ONLINE: What about in areas that are under state control or regulation? Meadows: That's even worse. Our history with fishing shows that we are destroying the oceans' ecosystems, for example. And we're using our atmosphere as a free industrial waste dump. Nobody has an incentive to protect them. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Is not the desire for humanity's survival enough of a motivation? Meadows: You see, there are two kinds of big problems. One I call universal problems, the other I call global problems. They both affect everybody. The difference is: Universal problems can be solved by small groups of people because they don't have to wait for others. You can clean up the air in Hanover without having to wait for Beijing or Mexico City to do the same. Global problems, however, cannot be solved in a single place. There's no way Hanover can solve climate change or stop the spread of nuclear weapons. For that to happen, people in China, the US and Russia must also do something. But on the global problems, we will make no progress. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Are you not underestimating people and the reaction when our backs are to the wall? Australian businessman and environmentalist Paul Gilding, for example, argues in his book "The Great Disruption" that while a crisis is coming, humanity will mobilize to fight it as seen during times of war. Meadows: He is right. But will it succeed? It could, if the delays were very short. But unfortunately, they are not. In climate change, for example, the delays are very long. Even if we were to reduce our greenhouse gas emissions to zero today, warming would still continue for centuries. The same is true for soil, which we are destroying globally. Recovery can take centuries. SPIEGEL ONLINE: Surely technological innovation has served to reduce the impact of some long-term problems. Since your book appeared four decades ago, for example, modern medicine has increased life expectancy and reduced infant mortality rates. New technologies have dramatically increased harvests and computers and the Internet have brought the world closer together and improved access to education. Meadows: Technology doesn't invent itself. These achievements were the results of decades of hard work, and someone has to pay for these programs. One big source of money is the military. Another is corporations, and they are not motivated to solve global problems, they're motivated to make money. The drug companies in the United States spend more money on hair-loss prevention than on preventing HIV infections. Why? Because rich people go bald and poor people get HIV. SPIEGEL ONLINE: But imagine the profits that would accrue to the inventor of a new, clean and limitless source of energy. Meadows: I hope you're not talking about fusion, because that's bullshit. I think we will discover a major new energy source. But afterwards, it would take decades for it to make an impact. Even if there was no resistance, even if there were no environmental impacts and even if it wouldn't make a lot of people bankrupt -- still it would take a long time. So if someone tells you that technology is going to save us just like that, he does not know how technology is developed.

### 2nc motivation fails

The link turn is empirically denied - alarmism is high now and responses to warming are low

Foust and Murphy 2009 (Christina R. Foust is an Assistant Professor in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. William O’Shannon Murphy is a doctoral student in the Department of Human Communication Studies at the University of Denver. "Revealing and Reframing Apocalyptic Tragedy in Global Warming Discourse" , Environmental Communication: A Journal of Nature and Culture, 3:2, 151-167 )

Since the release of Al Gore's award-winning documentary, An Inconvenient Truth, the American public has been faced with steadily increasing amounts of communication regarding climate change. Leiserowitz (2007) concludes, "Large majorities of Americans believe that global warming is real and consider it a serious problem, yet global warming remains a low priority relative to other national and environmental issues" (p. 44). Though the USA emits a shockingly disproportionate amount of greenhouse gases, large-scale policy changes or even a precursory conversation about overhauling the energy economy have been slow in coming. Meanwhile, climate scientists and others concerned about global warming have continued to sound the alarm with increasing urgency (Moser & Dilling, 2004).

### 2nc authoritarianism

Furthermore, political scapegoating ensures targeting of the third world

Gilbert 12

Emily Gilbert, Canadian Studies and Geography University of Toronto, 2012, "The Militarization of Climate Change," ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 11 (1), 1-14 7

First, the military’s interest in climate change resurrects a narrow concept of security. Although the 2010 QDR recognizes impending concerns associated with human security (eg migration, disease and food security), it models the anticipated conflict through a traditional state-to-state war scenario, refracted through a neo- Malthusian conflict over resources (Dalby, 2009; Homer-Dixon, 1999). Resource conflict and other climate change impacts are mapped onto already vulnerable places in Sub Saharan Africa, the Middle East, and South and Southeast Asia (Broder, 2009; CNA, 2007; Podesta and Ogden, 2007-08; Werz and Manlove, 2009), where, it is argued, they will act as ‘threat multipliers’ that will escalate into ‘failed state’ scenarios. This perpetuates a model whereby the enemy to the nation is elsewhere, and that ‘environmental threats are something that foreigners do to Americans or to American territory,’ not as a result of domestic policies (Eckersley 2009: 87). In this vein, the CIA has established a Center on Climate Change and National Security to collect foreign ‘intelligence’ on the national security impact of environmental change in other parts of the world.6

The bifurcation of domestic security and external threat reinforces a fiction of territorial and nationalist integrity, and works against thinking about climate change as a global problem with a need for global responsibility and global solutions (Dalby 2009: 50; Deudney 1999: 189).7 Moreover, the model of external threats coheres easily with the competitive frame that has been established between China and the US, as they vie not only for economic ascendency and resource- acquisition, but also for energy security and environmental policies and initiatives.8 In this vein, Thomas Freidman has proposed a militant green nationalism, something along the lines of a triumphalist Green New Deal that will recapture US global hegemony (Friedman, 2009).9 Achieving this result requires, however, more political agreement across US Democrats and Republicans, and it is precisely here that reframing climate change as a military issue seems to be an effective strategy for cross-partisan agreement.10 But what are the costs when militarization becomes necessary to legitimize climate change action?

The upshot is that the military is also legitimized, to the detriment of formal and informal politics. In a secretive and hierarchical military framework there is limited scope for public participation or legislative debate (UNEP 2007: 403). Militaries are about the ‘maintenance of elite power’ (Barnett 2001: 25). Issues regarding social justice are disregarded in favour of national objectives, while the vulnerabilities institutionalized through climate change are perpetuated (Barnett, 2006). This is particularly apparent vis-à-vis environmental refugees, which the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change estimates will swell to 150 million by 2050 (Reuveny, 2007). Militarism encourages the use of force against foreigners, with barriers erected to exclude those who bear the immediate impact of climate change, even though they are usually the least responsible for climate change. As Paul Smith notes, Operation Seal Signal, which the US deployed in 1994 to deal with 50,000 refugees from Haiti and Cuba, offers an instructive example of how the military addresses refugees, most of whom were held at Guantanamo Bay while their cases were processed (Smith, 2007). The responses to human tragedy in Haiti and Hurricane Katrina, when military priorities took hold over the immediate needs of the racialized, impoverished victims, speaks to the dangers of concocting security threats so that abandonment is prioritized over assistance (Giroux, 2006; Hallward, 2010). This is part of a worrisome trend of the rise of an ‘aid-military complex’ and military ‘encroachment’ on civilian-sponsored development (Hartmann 2010: 240).

## 1NR

### Psycho

#### Third is scapegoating – the attempt to suture the lack through the presentation of the plan text inevitability runs up against a wall and must find an explanation for such failure – this ensures a replication of domination and oppression

Stavrakakis 99 (Yannis, Prof @ U of Essex, Lacan and the Political, p. 107-8)//LA

In the light of our theoretical framework, fantasy can only exist as the negation of real dislocation, as a negation of the generalised lack, the antagonism that crosses the field of the social. Fantasy negates the real by promising to `realise' it, by promising to close the gap between the real and reality, by repressing the discursive nature of reality's production. Yet any promise of absolute positivity - the construction of an imaginarised false real - is founded on a violent/negative origin; it is sustained by the exclusion of a real - a non-domesticated real which always returns to its place. Sustaining a promise of full positivity leads to a proliferation of negativity. As we have already pointed out, the fantasy of a utopian harmonious social order can only be sustained if all the persisting disorders can be attributed to an alien intruder. Since the realisation of the utopian fantasy is impossible, utopian discourse can remain hegernonically appealing only if it attributes this impossibility -~ that is to say, its own ultimate impossibility -~ to an alien intruder. As Sartre has put it `the anti-Semite is in the unhappy position of having a vital need for the very enemy he wishes to destroy' (Sartre, 1995: 28). The impossibility of the Nazi utopia cannot be incorporated within utopian discourse. This truth is not easy to admit; it is easier to attribute all negativity to the Jew: All that is bad in society (crises, wars, famines, upheavals, and revolts) is directly or indirectly imputable to him. The anti-Semite is afraid of discovering that the world is ill-contrived, for then it would be necessary for him to invent and modify, with the result that man would be found to be the master of his own destinies, burdened with an agonising and infinite responsibility. Thus he localises all the evil of the universe in the Jews Sartre, 1995: 4O)~j ~As Jerrold Post has pointed out, we are always bound to those we hate: `We need enemies to keep our treasured - and idealised - selves intact' (Post, 1996: 28-9). And this for `fear of being free' (Sartre, 1995: 27). The fantasy of attaining a perfect harmonious world, of realising the universal, can only be sustained through the construction/localisation of a certain particularity which cannot be assimilated but, instead, has to be eliminated. There exists then a crucial dialectic between the universal fantasy of utopia and the particularity of the always local - enemy who is posited as negating it. The result of this dialectic is always the same: The tragic paradox of utopianism has been that instead of bringing about, as it promised, a system of final and permanent stability, it gave rise to utter restlessness, and in place of a reconciliation between human freedom and social cohesion, it brought totalitarian coercion. (Talmon, 1971: 95)

### Warming Inev

Existing carbon triggers the impact

Daniel **Rirdan 12**, founder of The Exploration Company, “The Right Carbon Concentration Target”, June 29, <http://theenergycollective.com/daniel-rirdan/89066/what-should-be-our-carbon-concentration-target-and-forget-politics?utm_source=feedburner&utm_medium=feed&utm_campaign=The+Energy+Collective+%28all+posts%29>

James Hansen and other promi­nent cli­ma­tol­o­gists are call­ing to bring the CO2 atmos­pheric level to 350 parts per million. In fact, an orga­ni­za­tion, 350.org, came around that ral­ly­ing cry. This is far more radical than most politicians are willing to entertain. And it is not likely to be enough. The 350ppm target will not reverse the clock as far back as one may assume. It was in 1988 that we have had these level of car­bon con­cen­tra­tion in the air. But wait, there is more to the story. 1988-levels of CO2 with 2012-levels of all other green­house gases bring us to a state of affairs equiv­a­lent to that around 1994 (2.28 w/m2). And then there are aerosols. There is good news and bad news about them. The good news is that as long as we keep spewing mas­sive amounts of particulate matter and soot into the air, more of the sun’s rays are scattered back to space, over­all the reflec­tiv­ity of clouds increases, and other effects on clouds whose over­all net effect is to cool­ing of the Earth sur­face. The bad news is that once we stop polluting, stop run­ning all the diesel engines and the coal plants of the world, and the soot finally settles down, the real state of affairs will be unveiled within weeks. Once we fur­ther get rid of the aerosols and black car­bon on snow, we may be very well be worse off than what we have had around 2011 (a pos­si­ble addi­tion of 1.2 w/m2). Thus, it is not good enough to stop all green­house gas emis­sions. In fact, it is not even close to being good enough. A carbon-neutral econ­omy at this late stage is an unmit­i­gated disaster. There is a need for a carbon-negative economy. Essentially, it means that we have not only to stop emitting, to the tech­no­log­i­cal extent pos­si­ble, all green­house gases, but also capture much of the crap we have already out­gassed and lock it down. And once we do the above, the ocean will burp its excess gas, which has come from fos­sil fuels in the first place. So we will have to draw down and lock up that carbon, too. We have taken fos­sil fuel and released its con­tent; now we have to do it in reverse—hundreds of bil­lions of tons of that stuff.

### Ag

#### The status quo food crisis in directly linked to the logic of neoliberal–speculation and land grabbing proves

Houtart 11 (Francois, Belgian Marxist Sociologist, serves as an advisor to CETRI (Centre Tricontinental) a Belgian non-governmental organization which he founded in 1976, was awarded the UNESCO-Madanjeet Singh Prize for the Promotion of Tolerance and Non-Violence, “ FROM ‘COMMON GOODS’ TO THE ‘COMMON GOOD OF HUMANITY,” ROSA LUXEMBURG FOUNDATION BRUSSELS, NOVEMBER)

There are two aspects to the food crisis. One is a conjunction of short-term factors, the other is due to (structural) long term factors. The former can be seen in the sudden rise of food prices in 2007 and 2008. It is true that this can be attributed to several causes, such as dwindling reserves, but the main reason was speculative, with the production of agrofuels being partly responsible (maize-based ethanol in the United States). Thus over a period of two years, the price of wheat on the Chicago stock exchange rose by 100 per cent, maize by 98 per cent and ethanol by 80 per cent. During these years appreciable amounts of speculative capital moved from other sectors into investing in food production in the expectation of rapid and significant profits. As a consequence, according to the FAO director general, in each of the years 2008 and 2009 more than 50 million people fell below the poverty line, and the total number of those living in poverty rose to the unprecedented level of over one billion people. This was clearly the result of the logic of profits, the capitalist law of value. The second aspect is structural. Over the last few years there has been an expansion of monoculture, resulting in the concentration of land-holdings – in other words, a veritable reversal of land reform. Peasant and family agriculture is being destroyed all over the world on the pretext of its low productivity. It is true that monoculture can produce from 500 and even 1,000 times more than peasant agriculture in its present state. Nevertheless, two factors should be taken into account: first, this kind of production is leading to ecological destruction. It eliminates forests, and contaminates the soil and the waters of oceans and rivers through the massive use of chemical products. Over the next 50 to 75 years we shall be creating the deserts of tomorrow. Second, peasants are being thrown off their lands, and millions of them have to migrate to the cities, to live in shanty towns, exacerbating the tasks of women and causing urban crises, as well as increasing internal migratory pressure, as in Brazil; or they are going to other countries (Mexico, Central America, Colombia, Ecuador, Philippines, Sri Lanka, India, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Morocco, Algeria, West Africa).Together with public services, agriculture is now one of the new frontiers for capital (Samir Amin, 2004), especially in times when the profitability of productive industrial capital is relatively reduced and there is a considerable expansion of financial capital seeking new sources of profit. Recently we have witnessed an unprecedented phenomenon: the land grabbing by private and State capital, particularly in Africa, for the production of food and agrofuels. The South Korean corporation Daewoo obtained a concession of 1,200,000 hectares in Madagascar for a period of 99 years, which provoked a serious political crisis in that country and finally a revision of the contract. Countries like Libya and the Gulf Emirates are doing likewise in Mali and various other African countries. European and North American mining and agro-energy multinationals are securing the opportunity to exploit tens of millions of hectares for long periods, as Chinese State and private enterprises are also doing. There is very little concern in these initiatives for the ecological and social implications, which are considered as ‘externalities’, i.e. external to market calculations. And this is precisely the second aspect of capitalist logic, after the growth of the rate of profitability. It is not capital that is having to deal with the negative effects, but local societies and individuals. This has always been the strategy of capital, even in the countries of the centre, with no concern for the fate of the working classes, or for the peoples in the peripheries under colonialism. There is no concern, either, for nature and the way of life of local populations. It is for all these reasons that the food crisis, in both its conjunctural and structural aspects, is directly linked to the logic of capitalism.

The affirmative’s discourse of “failed states” legitimizes an interventionist epistemology that effaces difference, makes north-south inequality inevitable, and is self-fulfilling

Eisenträger 12 (Stian Eisenträger, MA student in IR, board member at International Reporter, a Norwegian NGO, 3-27-12, “Failed State or Failed Label?: The Concealing Concept and the Case of Somalia,” <http://www.e-ir.info/2012/03/27/failed-state-or-failed-label-the-concealing-concept-and-the-case-of-somalia/>) gz

The end of the Cold War shaped a new international political context where the issues of democracy and human rights were brought out from the internal to the external scene. The weakened role of the Soviet Union gave the United States the possibility to increase its global influence. In this context *the absence of effective government* emerged on the world political agenda together with the concept of the “failed state” (Akpinarli 2009). Boutros Boutros-Gali and Kofi Annan, the former Secretaries-General of the UN, used the “failed state” term as early as in 1990, although the General Assembly or the Security Council never used it. Somalia, which was a typical case of the absence of effective government, was described by the UN without the use of the term “failed state”. The concept was then applied for the first time in the article “Saving Failed States” published in the winter edition of Foreign Policy Magazine in 1992-1993 (Helman & Ratner). This article, which was written in the post-Cold War context with its high aspirations for democracy, human rights, the more active role of the United Nations in safeguarding collective security and the emergence of the United States’ as the leading agenda-setting actor, established the basic concept and the paradigm. Although some have tried to incorporate “failed states” in international law, the term is highly debated because of the neo-colonial notion attached to it (Akpinarli 2009, 87-89). According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, the word “fail” can have a range of different meanings: “to lose strength”, “to fade or die away”, “to stop functioning normally”, “to fall short”, “to be or become absent or inadequate”, “to be unsuccessful” and “to become bankrupt or insolvent” (Merriam-Webster 2011). Thus, I would argue that the word is too imprecise to be meaningful in our attempt to broaden our understanding of the world. In addition, the word is heavily value-laden and has loads of negative connotations attached to it, and therefore I find it unsuitable to use in science. That journalists and politicians still use the term, which is both catchy and tabloid, is understandable when we take into consideration the rather brutal limitations of time and space these two occupational groups have in their struggle to reach their audiences. Nevertheless, numbers of scholars have used and still use the failed state label, many even without engaging critically with the term (Bates 2008; Ghani & Lockhart 2008; Holzgrefe & Keohane 2003, just to mention a few). The urge to “fix”: Securitization and intervention The failed state paradigm implies that there is something that needs to be “fixed” or “saved” – of course by “good” liberal democratic external forces. “Preventing states from failing, and rescuing those that do fail, are (…) strategic and moral imperatives”, Robert I. Rotberg (2002) proclaims in an article with the dramatic title “Failed States in a World of Terror” (the argument is elaborated in his book, bearing the same title). One can feel the notion of “the white mans burden”. One of the most neoliberal contributions in the failed states debate is probably that of Ashraf Ghani & Clare Lockhart (2008, 124) who in their book “Fixing failed states” boldly declare that “today states must fulfil their citizens’ aspirations for inclusion and development and also carry out a constellation of interrelated functions”. They conclude that states “in the world today” should perform ten key functions, which are: 1) Rule of law; 2) A monopoly of the legitimate means of violence; 3) Administrative control; 4) Sound management of public finances; 5) Investments in human capital; 6) Creation of citizenship rights through social policy; 7) Provision of infrastructure services; 8) Formation of a market; 9) Management of public assets; 10) Effective public borrowing. So now when we have the list, can we just go out in the world and start “fixing”? Fixing “failed states” is a dangerous exercise: For many policymakers the failed state label contributes to open up for and make a good excuse for military and other interventions. Petra Minnerop shows how the US throughout the second half of the 20th century developed several terms, for example “rogue states”, for “states to which it ascribed a high threat potential as regards the United States and international security” (2003). In the years to follow after the 1992 article in Foreign Policy Magazine the international community, with the US in the leading role, carried out military interventions in Somalia, Afghanistan and Iraq on the basis that the chaotic situation in these states poses a threat to the US and international security in general. The terms “failed state”, “rogue state” and “war on terror” have all been given prominent roles in the public debate. As Akpinarli also remarks, these concepts have been invented by the North to “solve” problems in the South, as well as to advocate for and justify military interventions to protect international peace and security (Akpinarli 2009). I would argue that the concept rather causes more trouble than it solves – not only in terms of military intervention, but also by keeping “failed” states in the margins of international relations. It would not be an exaggeration to claim that the labelling of “failed states” is a prime example of what the Copenhagen School of Security has dubbed *securitization*. The founding fathers of this concept point out that “a discourse that takes form of presenting something to an existential threat to the referent object does not by itself create securitization – this is a *securitizing move*, but the issue is securitized only if and when the audience accepts it as such.” (Buzan et al. 1998, 25). The audience – in this instance, ordinary citizens in the North – has to a large extent accepted the “failed state” paradigm, especially with reference to Somalia. Both the media and the large organizations working with/in/for the “failed state” are acting as agents for the securitizing actors – that is the governments in the North, especially the United States’ government. Somalia has been among the top five on the list since the first Failed States Index was published in 2005, and since 2008 Somalia has had the dubious honour of being the world’s “most failed state”. Whether it is possible to measure a state’s “failure” is a question that probably requires a book to be answered. Since 2005 the magazine and Fund for Peace have ranked the world’s countries after measuring the following variables: Demographic pressures, refugees/IDPs, group grievance, human flight, uneven development, economic decline, delegitimization of the state, public services, human rights, security apparatus, factionalized elites and external intervention (Fund for Peace 2011). No doubt that all these measurements may give a good indicator of how the situation is in a number of countries. However, my point and critique is that the index fails in grasping the vast empirical variations within the research object itself in the case of Somalia. Using the juridical state of Somalia as the object of analysis without looking under the surface becomes a serious hindrance of capturing the full picture. Somalia’s image problem As Michael C. Williams (2003, 527) excellently points out, “Security policies today are constructed not only with the question of their linguistic legitimation in mind; they now are increasingly decided upon in relation to acceptable image-rhetorics”. In this context we can identify the visualization of the verbal rhetoric of the failed state paradigm. The presentation of ”failed states” is often accompanied with depictions of a war-torn hell-hole, and the Foreign Policy Magazine takes the lead by presenting the Failed States Index together with a collection of photos appearing under the splash heading: “Postcards from Hell” (Foreign Policy Magazine 2011). When the Failed States Index is referred to by other news outlets, this kind of presentation is reproduced (for a recent example, see: BBC 2011a). I have yet to see an example of any media organization to examine the Index more closely. Only telling one side of the story is a serious problem. We can compare the use of the “failed state” label with how Somalia is depicted in the daily media coverage. How many times can you remember to have seen the pictures from Somalia, the disaster zone, with starving children, heavily armed Islamist fighters and dead people being dragged through the streets by a cheering mob? Quite a few times, I suppose. On the other hand, how many times have you seen pictures from Somalia showing farmers working in their fields, smiling and playful children, or the beach in Mogadishu crowded with both men, women and children? Probably not at all. Of course, the pictures of the disaster zone of Somalia are real and by every journalistic standard it is right to publish such pictures. The practice becomes a problem when these are the only pictures that are being shown, when the stories about starving children and dangerous terrorists are the only stories that are being told about Somalia outside Somalia. This misrepresentation in the media can for a large part be attributed to the “failed state” label that is burn-marked on the country, and which pay so little attention to the variations within the geographical area that makes up the state of Somalia. When a statement is repeated enough times, it becomes a “truth”. Politicians and scholars, as well as the media itself are responsible for this brand marking, and the process is self-reinforcing. The situation has reached the point where members of the Somali diaspora community in Norway has established an organization with one of its main goals to adjust the picture that has been made of Somalia and the Somali people (Iftiin – somalisk-norsk kunnskapssenter 2011). Somalia has a serious image-problem – literally. Not only does this put the country in risk of external intervention, it also contributes to keep Somalia and much of its population in the margins of international relations. There is a lack of representation of the people inhabiting the territory of the Somali Republic, both because the TFG lacks authority, but also because of the non-recognition of the de facto states of Somaliland and Puntland. Here we have to functional geopolitical entities that are not represented in the UN nor in other global or regional institutions. Furthermore foreign investors and tourists stay away because of the perception and understanding of the whole of Somalia being a ”failed state”. Africaand the Knowledge of Non-Being In his classic work Orientalism, Edward Said (2003 [1978]) scrutinize the history and nature of Western attitudes towards the East. He argues that orientalism is a powerful European ideological creation and a way for dealing with the “otherness” of Eastern culture, customs and beliefs. Achille Mbembe applies much of the same argumentation in his critique of Africanism. He says that historically, the West has constructed its own civilization, enlightenment and progress through the “others”, thus non-Western cultures, and especially Africa. Mbembe argues that: “Africa as an idea, a concept, has historically served, and still continues to serve, as a polemical argument for the West’s desperate desire to assert its difference from the rest of the world” (Mbembe 2001, 2). One of the challenges in grasping how things work outside the Western world is that many, if not even all, of the concepts we use when describing the universe of International Relations is based in Western history and thinking. Max Weber’s famous definition of the state as “a human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory (Weber et al. 1991, 78). In Western thinking, Weber’s definition represents the *idea* of an “ideal state”, and it seems like many have the perception that Western states fit into this idea or norm. When analyzing states in Africa, this is revealed when African states are compared with the *idea* of an “ideal state”, which is believed to be a prototype of a Western state – leading to the focus on African states’ absences, lacks and incompleteness, as weak or failed. In this way Mbembe’s analysis is straight to the point when he states that “while we feel we know nearly everything that African states, societies, and economies *are not*, we still know absolutely nothing about *what they actually are*”. Our knowledge of Africa is to a large degree based on the knowledge of non-being (Mbembe 2001, 9). But claiming that the “Western state” resembles the Weberian state, or even that the “Western state” is the norm, is highly problematic. First of all, every state has its own specific features, and the higher the degree of generalization, the more problematic it is. Secondly, Weber’s state is an idea of a state that has never existed in practice – even not in Europe or North America – for example when we take into account the important fact that private violence and private security has existed through modern history, and even today. Abrahamsen & Williams (2010), Colás & Mabee (2010) and Thomson (1994) are among several scholars who have demonstrated how private violence and private security takes form in e.g. private companies, criminal organizations and vigilante groups. If the states in Europe and North America are to be judged by the same standards as the states in Africa, many of these could get the “failed” label as well. Noam Chomsky, for example, has turned the tables in his book “Failed States”, where he shows that the US shares features with other “failed states” (2007). But does the “failed state” label provide us with more and better insight into how different states work; does it enlighten us in any way? Definitely not. The label conceals more than it enlightens. Abrahamsen & Williams (2010) argues that we must look beyond the state when analysing security issues in Africa. I would argue that we must look both beyond and within the state also when we want to analyse states in Africa, and especially Somalia.

### Mexico

#### Developmental approach to resolving politics has been tried and failed – it only serves to inflict structural violence on populations while filling the pockets of elites

Nhanenge 11 (Jytte Nhanenge, ecological and social activist, MA in development and MA in philosophy from the University of South Africa, extremely prominent theorist in development studies, 2011, “Ecofeminism: Towards Integrating the Concerns of Women, Poor People, and Nature into Development,” pp 19-22) gz

The official intention with establishing the development program in the South was to increase economic growth assumed necessary to alleviate poverty. However, there is no evidence that absolute poverty is decreasing; rather the reverse is the case. In addition, economic growth is declining. For economic growth and for almost all other development indicators, the 20 years as from 1980 to 2000 of the current form of economic globalization, have shown a clear decline in progress as compared with the previous two decades. In sub-Saharan Africa, per capita income fell by almost 25 percent during the 1980s. Investment has decreased with 50 percent, and export has decreased by 45 percent since 1980. The world’s low-income countries (2.4 billion people), account for just 2.4 percent of world export. External debt has risen from 10 billion USD in 1972 to 130 billion USD in 1987. Presently the Third World debt is around 500 billion USD. According to Shah, for every one USD the South receives in aid, it spends over twenty-five USD on debt repayment. In the poorest countries, it is commonly the people that did not enjoy the money, who are likely to pay the debt. Many development commentators find that lack of development is not causing these figures, rather development itself has brought about such impoverishment: when development turns natural resources, which provide a large number of people with decent subsistence livelihood, into industrial raw materials that benefit relatively few, then development creates poverty. (Ekins 1992; Naidoo 2009; Shah 2009b.) When development projects use the lands, soils, and waters of traditional people to produce commercial crop and industrial food for the market, then traditional people cannot anymore live from their natural resources. Moreover, major development projects often include removal of people from their traditional society into another social constellation with different norms where they cannot participate. The outcome of traditional people’s exposure to development is that they lose all, which gave meaning to them in their lives. Before development disposed them, they were not poor. They lived modest but self-sustaining lives from their environment. Their communities also considered them useful and productive members. However, when development diverted natural resources towards economic growth, people became poor and their natural resources became exhausted. From this, it follows that development destroys wholesome and sustainable lifestyles, creates scarcity of basic needs, excludes an increasing number of people from their entitlement to food, and generates real poverty or misery. Seen in this way, development is a threat for the survival of the great majority. Rather that being a strategy for poverty alleviation, development is consequently creating poverty and environmental destruction. (Ekins 1992; Shiva 1989, 1990.) One example is the World Bank sponsored Narmada Valley Project in India’s states of Gujarat Madhya Pradesh and Maharashtra. The proposed two large dams will displace 200,000 mainly tribal people, with no prospect of giving them fertile land elsewhere. The organization Survival International suggests that the Indian government has not identified land for resettlement because there is no land available. Other people occupy almost all of the cultivatable land in the region; the remaining land is too poor for permanent farming. These people will therefore become development refugees living in the slumps of Bombay, like so many before them. Beneficiaries from the dam will be the better off landowners, who will receive water for irrigation. The hydro-electricity produced by the dam will benefit the industries and the urban middle class. Experience shows that the wealth, the increased productivity will create, does not trickledown to the poor. Rather the difference between rich and poor will increase and poverty will intensify. Provision of drinking water meant to benefit the poorest people in the most arid lands was a major justification for the dams. It is highly unlikely that the dam will ever deliver this necessity. (Ekins 1992; Elliot 1994) In 1990, some 70 ongoing projects of the World Bank were forcibly displacing 1.5 million people. In almost all the cases, the dispossessed will end up impoverished. This is because the so-called “resettlement and rehabilitation” process is highly inadequate. In Indonesia, the Kedung Ombo dam displaced 20,000 without compensation. The 12,500 dispossessed of the Ruzizi II dam on the Zaire/Rwanda border received inadequate compensation. Another example is Kenya’s Kiambere hydroelectric project. BBC News showed the project in April 2005. For the television presenter the project was an example of how development alleviates poverty by giving local people energy as a way out of their poverty. Nevertheless, according to Ekins the project displaced 6,000 local people without compensation. (Ekins, Hillman, and Hutchison 1992.) In order to justify the centralization of traditional people’s natural resources the governments argue that industrialization will not only use the natural resources but also provide jobs and thus income for people’s survival. However, this is only a theoretical model. Often industrialists cannot use the labor of the indigenous people, who in a modern perception are unskilled, and who frequently are also illiterate. Hence, what industries want is to use the fields, forests, fishes, and rivers on which the people subsist. Thus, in the name of progress and development, the governments appropriate these resources, hand them over to owners of industries, who turn them into market goods, which the dispossessed can never hope to buy. (Ekins, Hillman, and Hutchison 1992.) One should add that even if these people would get work, employment does not necessarily generate an escape from poverty. Average wages in the US fell with 9 percent from 1980 to 1989. In 1987, 31.5 percent of the working force was receiving poverty level pay. According to the Census Bureau, median household income in the United States fell to 50,303 USD in 2008, a drop of 3.6 percent. This is the biggest annual drop seen since the government started keeping records in 1947. In Africa, it is also common that farmers and industries employ people as daily labors. In this way, they can pay salaries that are below the official minimum level. The exploitation of poor people, by rich people is a widespread practice in African countries. Hence, the profit from industries is not benefitting workers; the owners direct the profit to themselves and their shareholders. (Dave Manual.com 2009; Ekins, Hillman, and Hutchison 1992.) The reason why development cannot alleviate poverty relates to the false trust in the “growth and trickle-down approach.” The conventional belief is that economic growth will generate wealth in society, which eventually will trickle-down to the poor segment, and thus alleviate poverty. The blind faith in this strategy comes from its ability to make significant improvements in average life expectancy, infant mortality, literacy, and Gross National Product. Based on this experience development aid from the North is directed to increase economic growth in the South. However, what experts overlook, is the model’s inherent side effect of inequality. The distribution of the benefits is extremely uneven. The result is that people with the most desperate needs experience virtually no improvement in their living conditions. (Trainer 1997.) The growth strategy has the aim to maximize the rate of growth of business turnover i.e. to increase investment, sales, exports, and GNP, as fast as possible. The economic experts assume that the increased wealth this produces, the capitalists will re-invest in society; this will then further increase productivity, and will trickle-down and enrich even the poorest. In reality, very little wealth ever trickles down. The strategy does result in a rapid increase of national wealth, but those who are already rich get almost all of it. The reason that the wealth generated will flow into production of goods, which are attractive for the high-income earners and for export to the rich countries. Thus, the wrong industries will be set up in the South. Rather than producing simple tools, cheap housing, and clean water, all of which are helpful for poor people, capitalists invest their resources into export plantations or car factories. In addition, the rich people in the South often want to spend their money on Western lifestyles. They therefore import Western consumer goods, rather investing their wealth into social production. This will not give livelihoods to poor people. Their choice oppositely gives income to the North. Thus, paradoxically, development aid ends up benefitting the Southern elite and the rich countries in the North, which provided the initial aid, rather than the poor people in the country who received the aid. Consequently, the growth and trickle-down strategy is on a head-on collision course with anything that one can call an appropriate development strategy (Ekins 1992; Trainer 1997.) In this way, development creates a cycle that is exploitative of poor people in poor countries: First rich countries give aid to poor countries. Secondly, the aid benefits activities relating mainly to the middle-class and the elites. Thirdly, these people spend their profit on production of export goods or on imports from the rich countries. Fourthly, in the process the elite use the natural resources of subsistence living people. Fifthly, the traditional people loose their subsistence, and their governments do not compensate them; these people therefore become destitute and absolute poor. Paul Ekins (1992) calls it the “aid and development cycle.” Ted Trainer (1997)calls it “inappropriate development.”